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ABSTRACT
A number of our nation's airports depend on closely spacedparal-
lel runway operations to handle their normal traffic throughput when
weather conditions are favorable. For safety these operations are cur-
tailed in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) when the ceiling
or visibility deteriorates and operations in many cases are limited to
the equivalent of a single runway. Where parallel runway spacing is
less than 2500feet, capacity loss in IMC is on the order of 50 percent
for these runways. Clearly, these capacity losses result in landing
delays, inconveniences to the public, increased operational cost to the
airlines, and general interruption of commerce.
This document presents a description and the results of a fixed-
base simulation study to evaluate an initial concept that includes a set
of procedures for conducting safe flight in closely spaced parallel run-
way operations in IMC. Consideration of flight-deck information tech-
nology and displays to support the procedures is also included in the
discussions. The procedures and supporting technology rely heavily
on airborne capabilities operating in conjunction with the air traffic
control system.
Introduction
A number of our nation's airports depend on closely spaced parallel runway operations to handle
their normal traffic throughput when weather conditions are favorable. For safety these operations are
curtailed in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) when the ceiling or visibility deteriorates, and
operations in many cases are limited to the equivalent of a single runway. Where parallel runway spac-
ing is less than 2500 feet, capacity loss due to IMC is on the order of 50 percent. Even in the dependent
operations environment, where typically parallel runways are spaced between 2500 feet and 4300 feet,
capacity loss is frequently on the order of 25 percent. Clearly these capacity losses result in landing
delays causing inconveniences to the traveling public, interruptions in commerce and increased operat-
ing cost to the airlines.
Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) is a research and development activity aimed at
finding a solution to this lost capacity problem by applying flight-deck-centered technology. This work
is a part of the Reduced Spacing Operations (RSO) Subelement of the NASA Terminal Area
Productivity (TAP) Project. NASA Langley sponsored a workshop in the fall of 1996 that reviewed
work related to this research and development activity (ref. 1). An overview of the study and results
described in this document was presented at that workshop, and the slides used are reproduced in
reference 1.
In the years preceding the AILS research and development, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) made progress on the problem of lost parallel runway capacity in IMC through its Precision
Runway Monitoring (PRM) Program (ref. 2). Using ground-based technology consisting primarily of
more accurate radar and higher resolution displays for Air Traffic Control (ATC) stations, that program
has certified a system and procedures to operate independent parallel approaches as close as 3400 feet
in IMC.
Reference3documentsheresultsof aNASALangleycontractedstudyofparallelrunwayoper-
ations.Theeflbrt includeddevelopmentof aMonteCarlomodelof parallelrunwayoperationsthat
facilitatesparametricanalysesof theeffectivenessof avoidingnear-missincidentsandcollisionswhen
oneaircraftdeviatesfrom its nominalpathinto theairspaceof adjacentparalleltraffic. Thestudy
reportedin reference3alsousedthemodelthatwasdevelopedtoanalyzeparametersinfluencingclose
parallelrunwayoperationsandexecutionof safeescapemaneuverswhenanintrusionincidentran-
spires.Thatstudyandfurtherapplicationof themodelatNASALangleywereinstrumentalindevelop-
ingtheconceptunderinvestigationin thesubjectstudy.
Thisdocumentpresentsadescriptionandtheresultsof afixed-basesimulationstudyto evaluate
aninitialconceptthatincludesasetof proceduresforconductingsafeflight in thecloselyspacedparal-
lel runwayoperationsin IMC,aswell asinformationtechnologyanddisplaysto supporthoseproce-
dures.Theseproceduresandthesupportingtechnologyrelyheavilyonairbornecapabilitiesoperating
inconjunctionwiththeATCsystem.
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast: A position-reporting and limited data-
communication system under development for aviation applications
AILS Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing
ANOVA Analysis of Variance
ATC Air Traffic Control
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CDU Control Display Unit
DF Degrees of Freedom, parameter used in ANOVA
DGPS Differential GPS
dsply Abbreviation for "display," used in an ANOVA table
F F-test statistic used in ANOVA
FAF Final Approach Fix
GPS Global Positioning System: A U.S. Government owned space based navigation system
available for general purpose applications including aviation
ILS Instrument Landing System
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
MS Mean Square, used in ANOVA, equals the SS divided by DF
MOTAS
NASA
ND
NM
PF
PFD
PNF
PRM
R&D
RA
RSO
SAE
scn
s,d,
spd
spc
SS
TA
TAP
TCAS
TOGA
TSRV
VMC
Mission Oriented Terminal Area Simulator, an ATC and air traffic simulation facility
located at NASA Langley
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Navigation Display
Nautical Miles
Pilot Flying
Primary Flight Display
Pilot Not Flying
Precision Runway Monitor
Research and Development
TCAS Resolution Advisory
Reduced Spacing Operations
Society of Automotive Engineering
Abbreviation for scenario used in an ANOVA table
Standard deviation
Abbreviation for speed used in an ANOVA table
Abbreviation for runway spacing used in an ANOVA table
Sum of Squares, used in ANOVA
TCAS Traffic Advisory
Terminal Area Productivity (Project)
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System: An airborne collision-avoidance system
currently in use in the airspace system and required for commercial passenger transports
Take Off and Go Around
Transport Systems Research Vehicle
Visual Meteorological Conditions
The Concept
The basic concept under study is illustrated in figure 1. A pair of parallel approaches is under con-
sideration since that case is simpler than the triplet or quadruplet cases and does represent a costly real
world problem in itself. It is expected that the solution of the simpler two runway problem will lead to
solutions in the more complex cases. Figure 1 shows two airplanes on closely spaced parallel
approaches in IMC under the concept. Each aircraft is equipped with an accurate navigation system
such as Differential Global Position System (DGPS) navigation, an Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Broadcast (ADS-B) communication link to transmit or broadcast its own state and other information for
use by other airplanes and ground facilities. Each airplane also receives the ADS-B information from
the other airplanes operating within its proximity and on the adjacent approach. The airplanes are also
equipped with a traffic display, possibly similar to the TCAS displays currently in use, but upgraded
with monitoring and wamings specific to the parallel runway concept requirements. In this concept, the
primary responsibility for maintaining separation from traffic operating on the parallel approach is
shifted from the Air Traffic Control (ATC) facility to the flight deck of the airplanes. From a
separation-responsibility standpoint, this operation is similar to ATC oversight as with current Visual
Meteorological Condition (VMC) approaches to closely spaced parallel runways (visual approaches).
However, separation from other traffic, such as that behind and ahead operating in the same approach
stream, may be maintained as the responsibility of the ground-based ATC operation.
This basic concept for conducting closely spaced parallel approaches in IMC can be partitioned
into two primary aspects: (1) accurate navigation required to keep each aircraft in their own airspace,
and (2) an alerting and escape process to ensure safety in the event of an intrusion where one airplane
leaves its nominal approach path and threatens the safety of an airplane on the adjacent parallel
approach path. As a guideline, the display concepts were designed to adhere as closely as reasonable to
TCAS formats with deviations only where they appear to provide added value in supporting the parallel
approach requirements. Furthermore, in initial experimental implementations of the concept, the flight
deck display of information is presented as modifications to the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and the
Navigation Display (ND) since these are the display devices that normally occupy the majority of
pilots' attention during the approach phase of flight. Figure 2 shows the unmodified versions of these
instruments as they appear in the fixed-base NASA Transport System Research Vehicle (TSRV) Simu-
lator used.
The concept for presenting alerts in the flight deck was intended to adhere to the requirements of
SAE ARP4102/4 and its recommendations for level two and level three alerting (ref. 4). In that industry
standard, level two alerting requires presenting visual and aural information to the operator signaling
the alert condition using amber colors in the display. A level two alert does not require a corrective
action, although in some applications corrective action is appropriate. The level three alerting status
requires presenting visual and aural alerting information to the operator and has the color red associated
with its display. A level three alert requires that the operator takes a corrective action.
Required Tracking
The first of the two aspects of the flight-deck-centered parallel approach concept is to provide accu-
rate navigation to keep aircraft in their airspace along the approach paths. The concept incorporates
boundaries for an acceptable lateral deviation from the extended runway centerline that are generally
much closer to the runway centerline than boundaries defined by conventional two-dot ILS localizer
deviation. Using DGPS and controlling within the reduced boundaries reduces the potential for path
overlap. NASA is currently exploring use of the modified localizer path guidance illustrated in figure 3.
In the area of localizer capture the two dot deviation is 2000 feet on either side of the extended runway
centerline. Also, as is normal for parallel runway operations, the two parallel approach paths are sepa-
rated vertically by a minimum of 1000 feet during localizer capture. Approximately 12 NM from the
runway threshold, the two-dot localizer path widths begin to taper down to 500 feet on either side of the
extended runway centerline at 10 NM. After the 500-foot half-width area is entered, the higher aircraft
starts to descend, reducing the altitude separation. The 500-foot half width of the path is held from that
point to the middle marker, where the angular shape and width of the conventional localizer beam are
recaptured.
For the AILS concept, the localizer deviation pointer sensitivity will be adjusted by airborne
algorithms so that a two-dot deviation represents the AILS localizer boundary profile as shown in
figure 3. The DGPS navigation capability is assumed to provide the accurate navigation to support the
lateral path navigation along the entire approach. It is recognized that other technologies may also be
capable of providing the required level of navigation accuracy. The Required Navigation Performance
(RNP) is 0.04 NM.
An own-ship alerting feature has also been incorporated in the concept to prevent aircraft from
straying from their assigned airspace. Should an airplane deviate one dot or more from its nominal path
(but less than two dots), a level two alert is issued to the deviating aircraft with displayed information
presented in amber alphanumeric and symbolic formats in the PFD and in the ND, to warn the flight
deck crew to maintain a tighter path adherence. The PFD and ND in their nominal configuration during
an AILS approach where no alert has been activated are shown in figure 4. A display of the traffic on
the parallel approach has been added to the ND using TCAS symbol formats. Figure 5 shows an exam-
ple of the PFD and ND with a level two (caution) alert indicating an abnormal deviation of the own ship
from its nominal path. In the example shown in figure 5, the deviation is approximately one and one
quarter dots. Adhering to the SAE standard, the localizer scale and pointer, the own-ship symbol in the
ND, and the "LOCALIZER" alphanumeric symbol flashing near the center of the PFD are displayed in
amber. The display formats are discussed in more detail in a later section.
If an airplane deviates two dots or more from its localizer centerline, a level three alert is issued
on its flight deck displays. Figure 6 illustrates the display of a level three alert presented in the flight
deck of the aircraft deviating from its nominal path two dots or more. Again, the features of the display
will be described in more detail in a later section of this document. The level three alert requires imme-
diate corrective action by the flight crew. In the example of figure 6, the flashing "TURN CLIMB"
alphanumeric display, the localizer scale and pointer in the PFD, and the own airplane symbol in the
ND are displayed in red, indicating the requirement for a break-off maneuver in the direction away from
the parallel traffic.
The current AILS experimental concept requires use of a single identical break-off maneuver for
all parallel approach level three alerts. The aircraft is required to break off the approach by executing an
emergency turning, climbing maneuver to a heading 45 ° away from the nominal runway heading in the
direction away from the parallel approach path traffic. The flight crew must then contact ATC for fur-
ther instructions. In the current experimental implementation, a heading bug in the ND (see fig. 6) is
automatically set to the escape heading when the alerting algorithms are armed. Executing the break-
off maneuver is mandatory on receiving the two dot deviation alert; no recovery attempt is permitted.
This requirement for a mandatory break off may be relaxed in follow-up versions of the concept, pend-
ing further examination.
Alerting and Escape Maneuver for an Intrusion
The second aspect of the AILS experimental parallel approach concept addresses procedures and
flight-deck information presented to aid in avoiding collisions and near misses in the event that the par-
allel traffic strays from its airspace and approaches the path of the own ship in a threatening manner.
An onboard alerting algorithm, to be discussed later, uses state information from the traffic nominally
on the parallel approach, transmitted by ADS-B, for example, to detect threatening aircraft and provide
an onboard alert to the flight-deck crew of the threatened aircraft. Again, the alert is presented in the
PFD and the ND. A level two caution is presented in amber when the onboard alerting system detects
the threat as it starts to evolve. Figure 7 presents an example of the flight deck displays as such a level
two alert is issued. The word "TRAFFIC" is displayed in the central area of the PFD in amber. In the
ND the traffic symbol for the parallel airplane changes to an amber-filled circle according to TCAS
conventions. According to SAE standards, the flight crew is not required to take corrective action.
As the danger becomes more imminent based on the computations associated with the alerting
algorithms, a level three alert is issued. Figure 8 illustrates the display features presented as an intrud-
ing aircraft sets off the level three alert. Also, a computer-controlled voice message would be presented
when a level three alert is given: "Turn, climb. Turn, climb. Turn, climb." A level three alert caused
by intruder traffic requires the flight crew to break off the approach. The same maneuver is required as
when the own ship could not stay within its two dot lateral path boundary. This maneuver would be
depicted on the approach plate and is different than the missed approach procedure.
Intrusion Alerting Algorithms
The initial work to develop the intrusion alerting algorithms used in this study was completed in a
contracted study documented in reference 5. An alternative alerting algorithm was completed in a sep-
arate contracted study and is reported in reference 6. Primarily because of the higher level of maturity
of the algorithm presented in reference 5 at the time that this study was initiated, that alerting algorithm,
with some modifications to its details, was implemented in this experimental concept. This algorithm is
referred to as the segmented alerting algorithm and is described in detail in reference 5 along with steps
completed to validate it.
Figure 9 presents a summary of the features of the modified segmented alerting algorithm. Based
on the bank angle, track angle, and ground speed of the intruder airplane, the time and position of its
crossing the nominal path of the own ship is estimated. The parameters D and TAU are set by the user.
The protected distance about the own ship is D and TAU is a time parameter specified in seconds. The
distance of the traffic airplane from the own ship at the projected path crossing is computed based on
the state information of the two airplanes, assuming that the intruder continues on its current track.
Next, other potential ground tracks are considered. These are tangent to the projected turn arc in the
range of 5 ° to 35 ° from the runway heading (starting at the current track angle). If any path crossing
distance is determined to be less than D, the corresponding time (talert) of the intruder arriving at the
distance D from the own ship is estimated.
Alerts are initiated if
t_alert < TAU and projected range_at path_crossing < D.
The segmented alerting algorithms were implemented in two stages, a level-two caution and a
level-three waming. Threshold alert times and distances were selected for the level two and level three
alerts. These were established empirically based on test operations in the simulator prior to the experi-
ment. Table 1 presents the values used in the study.
Table 1. Time and Distance Threshold Parameters Used in the Alerting Algorithms.
Threshold Threshold
Alert Type Time, TAU Distance, D
Caution (level two) 30 sec 2000 ft
Warning (level three) 15.5 sec 1000 ft
The Experiment Design
The purpose of this experiment was to evaluate, in simulation, the effectiveness of a concept for
conducting parallel approach operations. This concept consists of two parts: (1) maintaining airplanes
in their own airspace and (2) avoiding an intruder aircraft by at least 500 feet should an intrusion inci-
dent occur. The experiment was designed to evaluate the effects of the following parameters on the
process:
1. Two different runway spacing environments--3400 and 2500 feet
2. Two different display formats
3. Two different intruder speeds, the intruder airplane being 30 knots faster or 30 knots slower than
the own ship
4. Different intruder paths or encounter geometries.
The modified localizer path width, described earlier, was used throughout this experiment. The
own-ship lateral path deviations from the extended runway centerline were monitored during the
approach operations to verify that the pilot could fly within the _+500-foot two dot path boundary.
The test matrix used is shown in the following table:
Table 2. Test Matrix
Display Formats
- Modified Conventional
- Enhanced
Runway Spacings
- 3400 ft
- 2500 ft
Intruder Speeds
- Intruder 30 knots faster
- Intruder 30 knots slower
Test Scenarios
- Five with 30 ° intruder heading
- One with no intruder incident
- One with intruder breakoff
A complete factorial design was used with 16 test subjects, all of whom were current line pilots.
One of two pilot confederates (in-house pilots who were not test subjects) acted as the pilot not flying
(PNF) with each of the test subjects who was the pilot flying (PF) in the experiment. Each of the two
pilot confederates participated as PNF with eight of the test subjects.
Display Formats
For this study, AILS parallel approach information was displayed in the PFD and ND. The study
assumes implementation in a glass flight deck aircraft, with an expectation that similar methods poten-
tially can be derived for implementation in electromechanical flight decks. Two display formats were
evaluated with differences occurring only in the ND. The two display formats are referred to as (1) the
Modified Conventional Display, which used the 10 NM range scale in the navigation display and (2) the
Enhanced Display, which used a specially added 2 NM range scale in the ND. Examples of the two dis-
play formats are shown in figure 10 in a nominal approach condition with no alerts activated. There
were some other differences in the details that will be discussed later.
In the ND of both formats (see fig. 10) an escape heading bug is set at the heading on the com-
pass rose at the AILS procedural 45 ° escape heading in the direction away from the parallel traffic and
runway. This bug is set automatically when the AILS algorithms are activated before the airplanes start
their descent, giving up their 1000-foot altitude separation. The AILS alerting algorithms are activated
at the point at which the airplanes enter the narrow linear 500-foot wide portion of the localizer path
(see fig. 3), 10 NM from the runway threshold.
Besides the scale change between the Modified Conventional Display and the Enhanced Display,
the own-ship symbol size was different. As shown in figure 10, for the Enhanced Display, the symbol
for the own ship is reduced in size and a 500-foot radius, scaled circle encloses the arrow-head shaped
aircraft symbol. The 500-foot circle represents the protected space around the own ship for avoiding a
near miss. In the case of the 10 NM range scaling of the Modified Conventional Display format, the
500-foot radius circle would be too small to be a meaningful display symbol, therefore it is not
presented.
Own-Ship Tracking:
Figure 11 presents an example of each of the two display formats when a level two alert (caution) is
presented to inform the pilots of their own ship straying from its assigned airspace, with more than one
dot but less than two dot localizer deviation. As previously discussed, the color amber or yellow is
associated with a level two alert according to industry display standards (Ref. 4). In both display for-
mats, the word "LOCALIZER" is displayed in the center portion of the PFD in amber. The own-ship
symbol is changed from white to amber in the navigation display of both display formats. Also, the
localizer scale in each display format is changed from its original white color to amber to assist the
pilots in recognizing the nature of the problem causing the level two alert condition.
Figure 12 presents an example of each of the two display formats when a level three (warning)
alert is presented to inform the pilots of their own ship straying from its assigned airspace with two dots
or more localizer deviation. This alerting condition requires immediate corrective action, i.e., the pilots
must execute an immediate, accelerating, climbing turn away from the direction of the parallel traffic.
The color red is used in displaying information related to a level three alert condition. In both display
formats the alphanumeric symbols "TURN, CLIMB" are displayed in the central area of the PFD. In
the navigation display the own-ship symbol is changed from its nominal white color to red (after having
been displayed in amber in the level two alert condition). Both formats include an aural announcement
"Turn, climb" repeated three times.
Intruder Alerting:
Figure 13 presents the two display formats with a level two alert in the case of the parallel traffic
having been determined to pose a collision or near-miss threat according to the intrusion alerting algo-
rithms. In each case an alphanumeric display of the word "TRAFFIC" is presented in the central por-
tion of the PFD in amber. The parallel traffic symbol is shown in the ND deviating from its nominal
path and colored amber. The Enhanced Display format has an added feature facilitated by its increased
magnification--a display of the predicted relative path of the intruder airplane. This display feature
presents the predicted path of the intruder airplane relative to the predicted path of the own airplane.
The prediction algorithm includes the assumption that the two airplanes will maintain their current atti-
tudes and speeds. The predicted relative path is displayed as a sequence of dots projected in 2-second
intervals. The intent of this display symbol is to allow the pilots, with a quick glance of the ND, to
understand the nature of the threat. It is emphasized that this display symbol is relative path and not
ground track information. The magnification in the Modified Conventional Display (10 NM range)
would not allow resolution of the features of such a relative path presentation; therefore, no such feature
was presented in that display format.
Figure 14 shows the two display formats with a level three traffic alert condition requiring imme-
diate corrective action. The "TURN CLIMB" red alphanumeric symbols are presented in the central
portion of the PFD similar to the level three condition for excessive localizer deviation. Both formats
include an aural announcement "Turn, climb" repeated three times. In the ND, the color of the traffic
symbol and its information tag is changed from the amber of the level two condition to red. As a dis-
play enhancement in the Enhanced Display format, a red arrow-head triangular symbol is used as the
traffic symbol to allow orientation of the traffic symbol to the heading of the intruding traffic. The pre-
sentation of the relative path information is continued in the level three alert presentation and its color is
also changed from amber to red. During escape maneuvering, the relative path display could be used by
the pilots to determine the effectiveness of the maneuvers they executed.
Runway Spacing
Two levels of spacing between runways were used in this study. The first was 3400 feet which was
selected to match the minimum runway spacing certified for current PRM operations. It was desired
that the test would substantiate that the flight-deck centered process would result in safety and perfor-
mance that was comparable with the PRM system certification at 3400 feet runway spacing.
The second runway spacing selected was 2500 feet, with the rationale that success at this spacing
would offer potential for a substantial but conservative incremental improvement over currently avail-
able technology. Based on earlier analysis and exploratory simulator operations, it was felt that there
was a high probability of success with this spacing.
Intruder Speeds
The two intruder airspeeds selected for use in the study were 30 knots incremental to the nominal
speed of 140 knots of the own ship. One level was 110 knots for a slower intruder and the second was
170 knots for a faster intruder.
Test Scenarios or Paths of the Intruder Airplane
Seven scenarios were used in the tests. These are illustrated in figure 15. The first of the seven traf-
fic airplane paths (1) was a normal flight profile with no unusual excursions from the localizer center-
line. The second path (2) was intended to simulate a profile where the parallel traffic airplane would
have initially made a lateral deviation from the nominal path toward the path of the own airplane. It
was assumed that the parallel traffic then received a level three turn climb break-off command from its
own tracking alerting algorithms. In that scenario, the potential intruder initiated a turning climb
maneuver in the direction away from the threatened airplane. In the other five paths, the intruder made
excursions in the direction of the own ship at 30 ° angles from its nominal track. Path three (3) was
designed to have the intruder pass 1500 feet ahead of the own ship if the own ship continued at its nom-
inal 140 knots with no turns. It was intended to generate a level two alert but not a level three. Path
four (4) was designed to result in a 500-foot pass ahead (with no evasive maneuver) and generate a level
three alert. Path five (5) was designed to result in a direct hit (with no evasive maneuver) and generate
a level three alert. Path six (6) was designed to present a nominal 500-foot pass behind the own ship
and generate a level three alert. Path seven (7) was designed to result in a nominal 1500-foot pass
behind the own ship and nominally generate a level two alert but not a level three alert. In summary,
with the selected parameters of the alerting algorithms, paths 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 were planned to intro-
duce a level two alert in the simulated flight deck. Only paths 4, 5, and 6 were designed to initiate a
level three alert.
The Test Facility
The test was conducted on the NASA Transport System Research Vehicle Simulator (fig. 16). This
facility is a fixed-base simulator of a generic glass flight deck. The dynamics of the simulated airplane
represented a Boeing 737-100 transport airplane. The control system used was an augmented manual
mode, attitude control wheel steering implemented with a side stick mount for left hand operation by the
pilot in the left flight-deck seat, who was the subject of the experiment. Other flight controls typical of
a transport airplane were operational, including a console mounted throttle control, a flap control, a con-
trol display unit (CDU), a mode control panel, a landing gear lever, rudder pedals, multiple radio con-
trol heads, and microphones for radio communication.
The flights were conducted using a generic terminal area model with runways 26L and 26R hav-
ing even thresholds. A crosswind of 10 knots from 170 ° or 350 ° was used in all runs, selected such that
it was in the direction of the intruder. Light turbulence was also included.
An oculometer for measuring operator look point was used to measure and record the eye scan-
ning behavior of the pilots. Reference 7 includes a discussion of this equipment and the techniques used
for analyzing the data.
Experimental Procedure
This section describes the procedure used to conduct the simulation experiment. It includes a dis-
cussion of the briefing given to the pilots and training prior to the experiment. It also presents a descrip-
tion of how the scenarios were generated and implemented in the experiment.
Pilot Briefing and Training
Each pilot was tested during a 2-day period. Training sessions were conducted on each day prior to
the testing sessions. The intent was to train the subjects to proficiency in accordance with normal air-
line procedures. The training on the first day consisted of a 1-hour presimulator briefing plus 50 min-
utes of simulator training. Two retired airline captains were used as training instructors. Each
instructor trained one-half of the subjects following a training script to ensure that the subjects would
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runs.
The 1-hour presimulator briefing began with a discussion by the experimenter describing the par-
allel runway study activity including a statement of the problem, a brief description of the AILS concept
as a proposed solution and the facilities to be used in the study. Next, the instructor pilot discussed the
role of the subject pilot in the experiment, features of the AILS procedures from the flight-deck perspec-
tive, the various safety alerts incorporated into the AILS algorithm from the piloting perspective, the
simulated airport and approach procedures, the TSRV simulator, pilot-flying (PF) and pilot-not-flying
(PNF) responsibilities, and the specific crew procedures that were to be used during the experiment.
The subjects were told that the same single response was always required when a level three intruder
alert was received. That response was to initiate an immediate, climbing, accelerating turn away from
the traffic to a heading of 45 ° from the nominal runway heading using a 30 ° bank angle.
The 50-minute simulator training session began with a description of the controls and switches
of the TSRV simulator. The subject was briefed on those features of the display and control system that
were different from the conventional technology in the field, information presented in the flight deck
that is specifically related to the parallel runway operations, the experiment, and the flight plan and
charts used in the experiment.
Three types of training runs were then accomplished to familiarize each subject with AILS pro-
cedures in the TSRV simulator. The first runs reinforced the normal AILS approach procedures that
had been previously discussed during the briefing. These runs were also used by the instructor to high-
light features of the simulator and displays. No alerts were introduced during these runs. The second
runs highlighted air work and allowed the subject to practice several "turn-and-climb" maneuvers. The
instructor observed the air work and provided feedback on numerous items including the proper posi-
tioning of hands on the throttles, feet on the rudders, use of the side stick controller, reaction time, and
roll, pitch, and yaw control. The third run types allowed the subject to practice the AILS procedure with
sample test cases including level three traffic alerts and allowed the instructor to determine if the subject
had been successfully trained to proficiency. In some cases the instructor and subject were satisfied
after one practice/evaluation run. Typically, not more than three were used.
The proficiency training was ended when, in the judgment of the instructor, the subject demon-
strated the correct AILS procedures and completed the escape maneuvers with a miss-distance of at
least 1200 feet with appropriate proficiency. Also the subject was asked if he or she was comfortable
with the procedure. According to the instructors, who had significant airline training experience as
instructors, this evaluation criterion is consistent with airline training for similar time critical maneuvers
such as a rejected takeoff (RTO), emergency depressurization, engine out on takeoff, and engine-out
missed approach. Once the subjects reached end-level-proficiency, no additional training or coaching
was provided and no training or coaching was provided during the data runs.
To aid the instructor in analyzing the subject's technique, the miss-distance, reaction time, and
mean EEM rate-of-roll were calculated for the evaluation runs and displayed on an unused portion of
the engine indicator and caution and alerting system (EICAS) display at the end of the runs. Generally,
the subjects became aware of this information and its significance during the training sessions. This
training information was not available in the flight deck after the training session was completed.
According to the instructor pilots who acted as consultants in designing the AILS procedures,
airline pilots are typically trained to mentally review time-critical maneuvers before the time of execu-
tion. Therefore, this technique was incorporated into the AILS training. Each subject was instructed to
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reviewthestepstobetakento accomplishanEEMduringthefinalapproachbriefingandagainmen-
tallywheneveranamber"traffic"cautionwasobservedin thedisplay.
Onlyoneof thetwodisplayformatswasusedonaparticulardaywith agivensubject.The
pilotsweretrainedwith theparticulardisplayformatthatwasto beusedduringthetestingof thatday.
Trainingtimewasprovidedatthestartof thesecondayforoperationswiththesecondisplayformat.
Theseconday'strainingrequiredapproximately20minutesin thesimulatorincludingtheinstructor's
explanationof thesecondisplayformatandthesubjectflying oneor twopracticeruns.Eightof the
sixteensubjectsweretestedwiththeModifiedConventionalformatfirst andtheothereightweretested
with theenhancedformatfirst to avoidconfoundingdisplayformateffectswith orderof testingor
learningeffects.
Intruder Profiles
The intruder path profiles were prerecorded in digital files. These files were based on the simulated
flights flown in a manual mode in the same atmospheric conditions used in the tests--light turbulence
and a 10-knot crosswind. Prerecorded flights were made with the intruder track deviation prescribed by
each of the seven scenarios of the test. The data in the files were manually manipulated to accomplish
the requirements for each data run. This was completed during the experiment setup period, prior to the
start of all testing. A more detailed discussion of how the prerecorded tracks were generated is pre-
sented in appendix A.
The test runs were started with the own airplane on one of the two approach paths with a heading
to intersect the localizer at a 30 ° angle. The traffic airplane was initiated for an approach on the parallel
approach path. Figure 17 presents an illustration of a plan view of a sample path of the two simulated
airplanes during an approach in which there was an intrusion. The intrusion angle was always 30 °. The
initial altitude separation of the paths was 1000 feet, with one approach nominally at 8400 feet and the
other at 7400 feet. The TSRV simulator was initialized at 8400 feet altitude during one half of the data
runs for a given pilot, and at 7400 feet for the other half. This was a factor included in randomizing the
order of test conditions to prevent the subjects from guessing the scenarios as they were presented.
Results
This section describes the results of the simulation experiment, including both objective and subjec-
tive measures. The analyses of miss distance and pilot reaction time include only the scenarios that
would have resulted in a collision or near miss if the pilots did not execute an escape maneuver. There
were three such scenarios included in the tests, scenarios 4, 5, and 6 (see fig. 15). Therefore, the size of
the experiment included in the analysis of variance was 384 tests trials (2 runway spacing levels x 2 dis-
plays x 2 intruder speeds x 3 scenarios x 16 pilots). The test design was a complete factorial design
with no replications. By the nature of the design, the pilot effect was implicitly confounded with the
replications. This meant that pilot effects could not be distinguished from repeats of the same condi-
tion. Therefore, no attempt will be made to analyze pilot differences. This is the normal protocol for
this type of experimental design. In analyzing this experiment, 0.05 or lower value of the significance
of F will be accepted as indicating a statistically significant difference.
Miss Distance
The miss distance is a key parameter in this study. Earlier studies (ref. 4 ) in certifying the PRM
system for 3400-foot runway spacing operations established 500 feet (assumed to mean center of mass
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to centerof mass)astheminimalmissdistance,belowwhichanearmissincidentwill haveoccurred
duringanintruderincident.Thusfor thisexperiment,500 feet or less clearance at the closest approach
would be taken to mean that the AILS process did not prevent an unacceptable situation. For clear
acceptability it would be expected that miss distances would be significantly in excess of this minimum
to assure that conclusions of the present study would be conservative. An Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) of the miss distances measured in this study is presented in table 3. The miss distances pre-
sented are three-dimensional slant range at the closest approach point.
Display Effects
Based on the analysis of variance (table 3), effects of the two formats of the display were not a sig-
nificant factor in determining the miss distances in this study. The performance of the pilots with the
Modified Conventional Display using the 10 NM range format in the ND was approximately the same
as with the Enhanced Display with the 2 NM range. There is also no evidence that the presentation of
the predicted path information in the ND benefited the miss distance performance. Figure 18 presents
mean miss distance versus display format and runway spacing. The mean miss distance for the 2 NM
range display is 1939 feet with a standard deviation of 258 feet. The mean for the 10 NM display range
is 1953 feet with a standard deviation of 274 feet. As the data included in figure 18 indicates, the miss
distance performance with each of the display formats was about the same within each runway
separation.
Runway Spacing Effects
In the ANOVA presented in table 3, runway spacing is shown to have had a significant effect on the
miss distance performance. This may seem to be an obvious result; however, the design of the alerting
criterion tends to dampen this effect by attempting to wait until a geometrically similar threatening situ-
ation to activate the alert for each runway spacing. Figure 19 presents the effects of runway separation
on the miss distance. The mean miss distance for the 3400-foot runway spacing is 1968 feet with a
standard deviation of 250 feet. The mean miss distance for the 2500-foot runway spacing is 1924 feet
with a standard deviation of 280 feet. The mean for the more distant runway spacing is 44 feet greater.
Although statistically significant, it is not clear that this difference has very much operational signifi-
cance. The closest approach overall in the test was 1183 feet in the 2500-foot runway spacing case.
This result supports the premise that the alerting algorithms tend to present alerts at similar geometric
configurations regardless of the runway spacing. The pilot performance was also approximately the
same at the different runway spacings, as will be shown in the analysis of response time presented in a
later section.
Relative Speed Effects
Relative speed of the intruder airplane was also found to have a significant effect on the miss dis-
tance (table 3). Figure 20 presents mean and standard deviation data for the effects of relative speed on
miss distance. The closest encounters were measured for the conditions in which the intruder was
slower than the own airplane; however, the difference is only 150 feet. Figure 21 presents the mean
deviations of the intruder airplane from its approach runway extended centerline at the time the alert
was activated. It shows that the intruder was farther displaced from its own runway centerline when the
alert was sounded for the slower intruder cases, and therefore closer to the parallel traffic approach path,
by an average of approximately 600 feet.
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Table 3. ANOVA of the Miss Distance Measurements
Source
of
Variation S S
display (dsply) 44354.50
spacing (spc) 428067.82
speed (spd) 3086506.07
scenario (scn) 7209434.60
display X spacing 56187.57
display X speed 6995.63
display X scenario 5669.66
spacing X speed 208367.25
spacing X scenario 95662.91
speed X scenario 7968264.83
dsply X spc X spd 3595.38
dsply X spc X scn 1462.04
dsply X spd X scn 18120.38
spc X spd X scn 492388.94
dsply X spc X spd X scn 31868.63
Model 19656945.75
Residual 10858362.31
Total 30515308.06
DF
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
23
360
383
Significance
of
MS F F
44354.50 1.47 .226
428067.82 14.19 .000
3086506.07 102.3 .000
3604717.3 119.5 .000
56187.57 1.86 .173
6995.63 .23 .630
2834.83 .09 .910
208367.25 6.91 .009
47831.46 1.59 .206
3984132.2 132.1 .000
3595.38 .12 .73
731.02 .02 .97
9060.19 .30 .74
246194.47 8.16 .000
15934.32 .53 .59
854649.82 28.34 .000
3162.12
79674.43
Scenario Effects
The scenario or intruder path was found to have a significant effect on the miss distances mea-
sured (table 3). Figure 22 presents additional data describing the effect of the different intruder paths on
the miss distance. Included are the results for the 500-foot pass ahead (should no escape maneuver be
executed), the center-of-gravity to center-of-gravity collision, and the 500-foot intruder pass behind the
simulated TSRV airplane cases. The mean miss distances for the collision cases and the 500-foot pass
ahead cases are close in value at 2059 feet and 2032 feet, respectively. The value measured for the pass
behind case (1747 feet) was approximately 300 feet less than the other two cases, indicating that this
was the worst in terms of miss distance.
Figure 23 shows the separation of the intruder airplane from the own ship when the level three
alert was initiated. Each of the six scenario and speed combinations is presented separately. The case
in which the intruder airplane was slow and set up to pass behind the own ship was the closest to the
own ship when the level three alert was initiated. Figure 24 shows a plot of the mean separation of the
two airplanes versus time from the alert. A plot for each of the six scenario and speed combinations is
included. One quarter second time increments were used. Each point on the plots averages 64 separa-
tion distances (16 subjects x 2 runway spacings x 2 displays). These plots show that, in the case of the
500-foot slow intruder passing behind, the intruder is closer when the alert is presented and remains
closer over the period of the evasion maneuver, at least up to point of closest approach. The alerting
algorithms include consideration of the proximity of the slow intruder approaching from behind. It
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evaluates that case as posing a less time-critical threat than the other cases tested. Therefore, it allows
these threat cases to approach closer than it does the other cases tested before initiating an alert.
Several interaction effects were shown to be significant in the ANOVA presented in table 3.
Included in these was the two-way interaction of speed and scenario. This interaction was essentially
discussed in the explanation of the scenario effect above and the related results are shown in figure 22,
which shows that, in the intruder passing behind case, the slow speed of the intruder resulted in a closer
approach than the other cases. The source of the significance of the other interaction effects does not
appear to be quite so clear. Figure 25 presents closest approach versus runway spacing and relative
speed and figure 26 presents closest approach versus runway spacing, relative speed, and scenario.
When measured from the time of the level three alert, the intruder's progress in the 30 ° turns was
different for the 3400- and the 2500-foot cases. More of the turning path of the intruder was included in
the evaluation of the 2500-foot case than in the 3400-foot case. This implies that the relative paths of
the intruder were actually different between the two runway spacing values, but this is realistic in terms
of the physics of the situations. Also, the ground speed (and subsequently the airspeed) of the intruder
is a factor in the turning arc and therefore influences the time before the rollout occurred to capture the
30 ° relative cross track.
Pilot Reaction Time
Pilot reaction time was measured as the time from the start of the level three alert until the pilot
input of a half-stick roll attitude control deflection or until the autothrottle disconnect button was
pressed. The bench mark response time for the break off procedure was 2.0 seconds as is used in airline
procedures for a rejected takeoff. An ANOVA of the response time measurements was conducted;
however, none of the independent variables were determined to have significant effects on the reaction
time. The mean reaction time for all test conditions was 0.71 second with a standard deviation of
0.22 second. Figure 27 presents the reaction time versus runway spacing and display format.
Tracking Performance
The data were analyzed to determine the amount of time each flight exceeded one dot and two dot
localizer deviation. This analysis was made only when the aircraft was within the 500-foot two-dot
localizer width section of the approach and when no red alert had been initiated. The analysis included
all data runs. One subject exceeded the one dot boundary during three different runs for periods of 8.5,
6.5, and 9.25 seconds, respectively. There were no other excursions by any pilot outside of the 250-foot
one dot width. The total flight time included in the evaluation was 40.71 hours. The portion of the run
time inside the +250-foot band was 99.98 percent.
Pilots' Use of the Displays Based on Scanning Behavior
The oculometer data, recording pilot look point, was reduced by dividing the display area into six
rectangular regions (see fig. 28) that captured the primary flight display (PFD), the navigation display
(ND), the front window, the mode control panel (MCP), and the engine status and miscellaneous infor-
mation (Misc. Info). The engine status and miscellaneous information CRT's were initially included in
the analysis but were removed because no data were measured in those areas. Previous studies have
shown that most of the attention of the pilot flying is focused in the PFD and ND during the approach
phase of flight. The focus of this discussion is therefore on these two areas in the following analysis.
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Thisanalysisaddressesonlytherunsduringwhichtherewasanintruderwaming(redalert)ini-
tiated.Eachsimulatedflightwasanalyzedfirst asanentirerunwithall dataincludedfromthestartof
therununtil it wasterminated.Next,eachflightwasdividedintothefollowingsixsequentialpartsor
segmentsfor additionalanalysis:
1. Segment1wasfromthestartofthemntolocalizercapture.
2. Segment2 wasfrom thelocalizercaptureto glideslopecapturein thevicinity of the outer
marker.
3. Segment3wasfromglideslopecaptureuntil 15secondspriorto theintruderwarning,redalert.
4. Segment4wasfrom15secondsbeforetheredalertuntil theendof therun.
5. Segment5 is includedin segment4 andwasfrom 15secondsprior to thealertuntil thered
intruderwarningalertwaspresented.It includesthecautionalertperiod.
6. Segment6 includestheperiodfromtheredalertuntil themn ended,andis alsoincludedin
segment4.
Theprimaryparameterselectedtodescribethepilots'useof thedisplaysis thepercentageof the
lookpointdwell(dwellpercentage)on thePFDandtheND. Thedwells(sometimesreferredto as
dwelltimesin experimentalpsychologyliterature)aretimeperiodsduringwhichthepilot's lookpoint
isdeterminedtobestable(notin transitionwithinaninstrumentorbetweeninstruments).Thefollow-
ingdefinitionsareassumedandareconsistentwithsoftwarevendor-supplieddescriptionsalthoughnot
necessarilyconsistentwith someof theexistingoperatorscanningbehaviorliterature.A "dwell" is
definedasthetimeperiodin secondsduringwhichafixationorseriesof contiguousfixationsremain
withinanareaof interest.A fixationisa(pilot'sorotherhumansubject's)viewingeventcharacterized
bythex,y-lookpointcoordinatesmeasuredbytheoculometerremainingwithina1°by 1° areaduringa
0.10-secondperiodor longer.Thiscontrastswithasaccade,duringwhichtheeyesareconcludedto be
in motionfromonefixationpointto another,whenno informationis assumedto beabsorbedby the
subject.In effect,thedwellpercentagefor adatacollectionperiodrepresentsthetotalpercentageof
timethepilot wasviewingtheinformationpresentedin theparticularareaof interest,suchason the
PFD. It isnormalizedbasedonthetotaltimethepilot wasdeterminedtobevisually"fixating"onany
locationduringtheperiodunderexamination(e.g.,testran). If ameandwellpercentageof 85percent
wasdeterminedfor thePFD,thatmeansthatoutof all of thetimethesubjectwasmeasuredto belook-
ingatlocations(alldwells),85percentof thetimewasdeterminedto beviewingthePFD. In general,
thedatapresentedin thefollowingdiscussionarepooledoverall subjectsof thesimulationtests.
Overthesetof dataanalyzed,dwellsin thePFDandtheND accountfor approximately90per-
centof all totalviewingtimerecorded.One-and-one-halfpercentof thedwelltimewasdeterminedto
beoutof thefrontwindowviewing.Approximately8 percentof theotherlocationswereatpointsnot
recognizedbythedataanalysischeme.
Figure29presentsa summaryof thedwellpercentagesof thepilots' viewingoverthesetof
entirerunsseparatedforthetwodisplayformats,theModifiedConventionalDisplayandtheEnhanced
Display.Thedwellpercentageson theND showthattherewasmoreuseof theND whenthehigher
magnificationdisplay(2NM, EnhancedDisplay)wasused.ThedwellpercentagewhentheModified
ConventionalDisplaywasusedis5.4percentandwhentheEnhancedDisplaywasusedit was6.4per-
cent. Althoughthereis only asmalldifferencein themagnitudeof the increaseof about1 percent
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(where percentage is the normalized unit of the measurement), the difference was found to be highly
significant at better than the .001 level in the analyses of variance presented in table 4. The increase is
(1.0/5.4 x 100 =) 18.5 percent (referring to proportions and not the unit of the measurement). One
might be inclined to think that the 1-percentage point measured increase is not of physical significance;
however, this is a statistically significant measurement that relates to the pilots' evaluation of the
Enhanced Display as being more desirable.
Table 4. Analysis of Variance of ND Dwell Percentages
ANOVA
Degrees Significance
Sum of of Mean (Type I error
Source Squares Freedom Square F Probability)*
Display 1484.3 1 1484.3 24.5 .000
Segment 4322.8 5 864.6 14.3 .000
Display × Segment 448.0 5 89.6 1.42 .193
Residual 126988.2 2100 60.5
Total 252500.5 2112
*Values of .05 or less are interpreted as statistically significant.
The results presented in table 4 show that the display format was found to be a statistically signifi-
cant effect, and the run segment was significant. This finding indicates that in the different segments of
the simulated flight some differences in amount of viewing of the ND were measured and that it would
possibly be informative to look at the segment differences to better understand the effects of the display
formats on the dwell percentage.
In terms of physical units the difference is small, a change of 1 percent of all of the look point
dwells. Yet, further analysis indicates the difference is caused by a high percentage of viewing of the
Enhanced Display in the periods during the emergency condition when the intruder alerts were in effect.
Figure 30 presents dwell percentage data broken down in terms of segments of the approach and
includes data for both display formats combined. It is evident that there is relatively high use of the ND
in segment 1 during localizer capture as would be expected. Use of the ND is relatively low in seg-
ments 2 and 3, as also would be expected considering that there are only minimal navigational tasks for
the flight crews in this portion of the flight. Lateral displacement from the extended runway centerline
in the form of localizer deviation information is included in the PFD. However, during the period of
time associated with the intrusion incident, captured in segments 4, 5 and 6 (segment 4 includes seg-
ments 5 and 6), use of the ND is at its highest levels. This shows that the ND, which includes the dis-
play of the parallel traffic, is used an increased amount by the pilot flying during the period in which the
intrusion incident is in progress.
Figure 31 presents dwell percentage data for the flights using the Modified Conventional Display.
This figure shows that the trends in using the ND along the approach segments are the same as for the
combined results of the 10 NM and 2 NM ND; however, the amounts of utilization in segments 4
(Alert-15), 5 (Alert-15->End), and 6 (Alert->End) are less than the corresponding means for the com-
bined data set (fig. 30). This observation clearly shows that the utilization of the ND in these segments
is higher in the flights where the 2 NM range Enhanced Display (that also presents the predicted relative
path information) was used. Figure 32 presents the dwell percentage data for the flights where the
Enhanced Display format was used. In segment 4, the segment in which the intrusion incidents
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occurred,the dwell time whenusingthe ND was10percentwith the EnhancedDisplayformat
comparedto 7 percentwith theModifiedConventionalDisplayformat. Basedondwellpercentage
measurements,it is concludedthatduringtheprocessof managinganintrusionincident,the2 NM
rangeND wasused(3/7x 100=) 43percentmorethanthe10NM format. It is emphasizedthatthe
scalingof theEnhancedDisplaywasnot theonlyformatdifference.In particular,therelativepath
informationpresentedmayhavebeenasimportantaninfluenceastheincreasedscalefactor.
In summary,thedwellpercentagedatashowthatthe2NMenhancednavigationdisplaywasused
morethanthe10NM format. Thissupportstheclaimsof thepilotsin theirevaluationsof thedisplay
formatsthatthe2NMformatwasmoreusefulduringtheintrusionincidents.Therewerealsomeasured
statisticallysignificantincreasesin useof theND duringthesegmentsof theflight duringwhichthe
intrusionincidentoccurredcomparedtothestraight-infinalapproachsegmentsprecedingtheintrusion
incidents.
To somedegree,variationin thepilots' useof thePFDreflectedtheinverseof thechanges
observedfor theND. Figures29through32showthatthereismostoftenadecreasein thedwellper-
centageonthePFDwhenthereisanincreasein thedwellpercentageontheND. In theanalysisofvari-
anceresultsof thePFDdwellpercentage(table5), thedisplayandthesegmentwerebothsignificant.
Thediscussionabovefocusedon theND fromthevantagepointthatchangesin thePFDusageproba-
bly resultedfrom shiftsof viewingfromthePFDto theND. It wasalsonotedthatduringthealert
period,particularlyasanevasivemaneuverwasinprogress,thepilot'sheadwasinmotionasdifferent
locationsin theflightdeckwereviewedandcontroleversmanipulated.Theheadmotionresultedin
significantlymorelossof lookpointdatathantheportionsof theflightswheremorenormaloperations
werein progress.Therefore,theproportionof thepilotlookpointdatathatcouldbesuccessfullyana-
lyzedwaslowerin thosesegments.
Table5.AnalysisofVarianceofPFDDwellPercentages
ANOVA
Significance
Sumof Degreesof Mean (TypeI error
Source Squares Freedom Square F Probability)*
Display 5065.2 1 5065.2 14 .000
Segment 231146.5 5 46229.3 128 .000
Displayx Segment 1820.5 5 364.1 1 .411
Residual 758055.9 2100 361.0
Total 995978.8 2112
*Valuesof.05orlessareinterpretedasstatisticallysignificant
Pilot Evaluation
The pilots were given a debriefing questionnaire at the end of the testing of each display and ran-
way combination. There were four debriefing sessions for each pilot since there were two runway spac-
ings and two display formats. The other independent variables of the test were distributed and balanced
within the four sets of runway spacing and display format groups. The final debriefing session included
two additional forms on which the pilots were asked to evaluate miscellaneous aspects of the
experiments.
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Appendix B provides a copy of the forms used and a compilation of the responses of the subject
pilots. The data presented also include the comments made by each subject on the forms. The follow-
ing subsections present a summary of the responses made by the pilots in a narrative format.
Display of Parallel Traffic
The subjects were asked about the extent of their use of the traffic display in the ND. Their answers
reflected a general view that during the localizer capture phase of the flights they used it a significant
amount. Most replies ranged from "occasionally" to "frequently," although some subjects marked the
"never" and "rarely" choices. When asked a similar question about the straight-in portion of the
approach, the choices made were even more clustered in the "occasionally" to "frequently" range.
The subjects were asked about the usefulness of the traffic display in the ND. When the
Enhanced Display was used, they generally replied that this display was helpful, most often selecting
"somewhat helpful" or "quite helpful" as their choice. Two subjects chose the "essential" selection.
When the Modified Conventional Display was evaluated, the majority of the replies were also "some-
what helpful" or "quite helpful." However, a number of the subjects selected the "of little help" choice
for this display format. This is the only item on the questionnaire for which the ANOVA analysis of the
replies, discussed in a later section, showed a significant difference. The difference was between the
two display formats.
The subjects were asked about the workload in using the two display formats. They generally
replied that the additional workload associated with using the display formats was "moderate" to "low."
Use of the Out-of-the-Window View
The subjects were asked about their out-of-the-window viewing, since it was possible that the
intruder could be seen out of the window in some situations. The visibility in the fog scene was speci-
fied as 1/4 NM. They were asked about their out-of-the-window viewing in attempting to see the traffic
during each of four phases of the flights: the localizer capture, the straight-in portion of the approach,
the period during the evasive maneuver, and the period after the evasive maneuver. The replies were
about the same for each. Most were distributed between "never" and "rarely." A few "occasionally"
responses were given and one subject responded "frequently" for the period after the evasive maneuver.
Alerts
The subjects were asked if the time available after the level three alert was given was adequate to
maneuver safely. The choices were: inadequate, somewhat inadequate, about right, somewhat exces-
sive, and highly excessive. Most of the subjects chose "about right." Two or three, depending on which
of the display and runway combinations, chose "somewhat excessive."
When asked about the alphanumeric "TURN, CLIMB" presented near the center of the PFD,
their selected responses ranged from "somewhat helpful" to "absolutely essential," with the largest
number of replies being "very helpful" or "absolutely essential." When asked about the computer voice
alert "Turn, climb! Turn, climb! Turn, climb!" the replies were similar to those given for the alphanu-
meric presentation of the alert, with somewhat fewer responses in the "absolutely essential" choice.
The "very helpful" choice was favored instead.
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Traffic Path Information in the ND
For the case of the Enhanced Display, the subjects generally indicated that they did not look at or
rarely looked at the predicted path information prior to initiating a maneuver when the level three alert
was given. Two subjects did indicate that they looked "occasionally" or "frequently."
The subjects were asked if acquiring information on the probable path of the intruder was impor-
tant in avoiding a collision. Their choices were: never, rarely, occasionally, frequently, and always.
Their replies were distributed fairly evenly over the range of choices when the Enhanced Display for-
mat was used, and clustered more around the "never" and "rarely" choices when the Modified Conven-
tional Display format was used.
The subjects were asked whether the relative path information aided in a decision to maneuver.
The relative path information could be viewed after the level two caution alert was given, prior to the
level three alert, as well as during the level three alert. Half of the subjects chose "never." The other
responses were generally distributed between "rarely" and "frequently." They were asked whether the
predicted path information aided them in determining what maneuver to make. The replies were fairly
evenly distributed over the range "never" to "always."
The replies to the similar question about the traffic information when the Modified Conventional
Display was used showed a stronger bias toward the choices indicating that the information was not
used or not helpful in making decisions about the escape maneuver, although a few replies indicated
occasional help.
Summary of the Subjects' Comments
The following statements summarize the results of the debriefing with an attempt to highlight the
most important points. However, since some discretion was necessary in developing a summary and all
comments are not reflected in the list below, review of the specific comments made by each subject
(appendix B) will provide the reader with a better understanding of the comments made.
1. The consensus of pilot opinion was that this definitely is a realistic process and an excellent start.
2. The pilots generally preferred the 2 NM display capability.
3. They felt that the task can be accomplished adequately with the 10 NM map scale range.
4. They recommended displaying escape heading information and also providing information indi-
cating that the AILS alerting algorithms were "armed" in the PFD.
5. They felt that the pilot flying would use the ND display in a minimal manner, while a pilot not fly-
ing would pay heavy attention to the traffic display.
. They recommended providing escape guidance in the PFD. Specifically they recommended
keeping the flight director command bars active during the escape maneuver to provide the
desired guidance.
7. They recommended making AILS an autopilot coupled approach procedure.
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. They stated that the 45 ° degree heading comes up too quickly in the "violent" maneuver called
for in the procedures and using a turn to 90 ° or at least something significantly more than the 45 °
heading would be better.
. Several pilots commented that they would have broken off with an airplane crossing in front of
them as in the 1500 foot ahead intruder pass where no break-off or level three alert was pre-
sented.
10. Some concern was expressed that the single escape maneuver was not always appropriate.
Some pilots felt that breaking to the side of the approaching traffic was occasionally appropriate.
For example, if the traffic is approaching from the right rear, it might be more feasible to break to
the right.
11. Concern was raised by one pilot that the intruder might try to correct back to the nominal path.
In this case, the display elements might not accommodate the off nominal behavior of the unpre-
dictable situation.
(Note: Pilot 2, q. 17: There could be a situation when the intruder has passed in front or behind,
therefore changing sides. Then if he decides to get back on course, he could intrude again from
the other side, causing your escape bug to be invalid.)
12. The pilots felt that the 2 NM display range in the ND gives good situation awareness during an
intrusion. The wide field of view, 10 NM display range does not.
13. One subject suggested that the pilot flying could have a wide field of view while the pilot not fly-
ing uses the high resolution small field of view. The pilot not flying would then relay informa-
tion to the pilot flying.
14. One pilot suggested including a marking showing when a red alert will be issued on the relative
path display in the ND.
15. One subject suggested keeping aircraft on the same frequency for improved situation awareness.
16. Several pilots commented that the lag between the visual "Turn climb" in PFD and the aural
"Turn, climb .... "was disturbing and that it should be avoided. (The visual information appeared
first.)
17. One pilot commented that the 10 NM ND display was not very useful and distracted the pilot's
attention from the PFD when he was trying to gain situation information from the low resolution
presentation.
18. One pilot commented that the "expanded mode was too expanded- traffic off of the screen pops
up and becomes a factor too quickly."
19. Several pilots recommended the addition of tum direction to the alert displays. Visual: Left
turn, climb. Aural: Left turn, climb ... etc.
20. One pilot commented that a trend vector (predicted path information) on the intruder in the
Modified Conventional Display format would be helpful.
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21. One pilot commented that flight ID information on the traffic added to the clutter and provided
no useful information.
ANOVA of the Questionnaire Data
Analyses of variance were completed on the responses given by the pilots on the debriefing ques-
tionnaire. The dependent variables were the subject response selections made on the debriefing forms.
Each response was given a numeric value 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 according to the order of the response on the
form. The responses were ordered to be qualitatively descending or ascending on the questionnaire
form. The responses compared in a given ANOVA were the same set of choices in response to the same
question.
For example, one question was:
1. During the localizer capture, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
If the response was "a," it was converted to 1 in the analysis. A response of "b" was converted to 2, "c"
to 3, "d" to 4, and "e" to 5. This question was presented for the Enhanced Display with each of the two
runway spacing levels. It was also presented for the Modified Conventional Display combined with
each runway spacing. Once the qualitative data were converted to quantitative data, a conventional
ANOVA was completed for that question. The independent variables were the two levels of display
format, and the two runway spacing levels.
Table 6. ANOVA of Response to the Question Rating the Value of the Display Formats.
ANOVA
Degrees
Sum of of Mean
Source Squares Freedom Square F Significance
Display 11.39 1 11.39 22.73 .000
Spacing .14 1 .14 .28 .598
Display x Spacing .39 1 .39 .78 .381
Residual 30.06 60 .50
Total 819.00 64
There was only one question that resulted in statistically significantly different responses at the .05
significance level or better. This was question number three (3) on the questionnaire form:
Overall, I found the navigation display of traffic in this mode
a. distracting b. of little help c. somewhat helpful d. quite helpful e. essential
The results of the ANOVA for this question are presented in table 6 where only the "Display" factor is
shown to be significant.
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Conclusions
An initial simulation study of a concept for flight-deck-centered approaches to parallel runways in
IMC has been completed. The concept includes flight-deck-centered technology and procedures to
assist the pilots in maintaining flight in their assigned airspace and to assure safety in the event of an
intrusion where one airplane threatens to cross into the airspace of another.
This study included two values of runway spacing (3400 feet and 2500 feet), two display condi-
tions, two intruder airplane speeds, and three intruder paths across the approach path of the own ship
that were collision threats. Four intruder scenarios that were not collision threats were also included.
Sixteen airline pilots participated as test subjects.
Mean miss distance during intruder incidents and pilot reaction time were the measurements of
highest interest in this study. For the level-three-alert intrusion cases, the mean miss distance recorded
was 1946 feet (s.d. 266 feet) and the mean pilot reaction time was 0.71 second (s.d. 0.22 second). Vari-
ations in display conditions did not produce a statistically significant difference in the miss distance or
pilot reaction time. However, most of the pilots commented that they preferred the Enhanced Display
that included the higher magnification scale factor in the ND and a display of the relative path of the
intruder. Their comments indicated that with a quick glance they could discern the necessary situation
information with the 2 NM range-scaled ND of the Enhanced Display. However, they commented that
that was not the case with the 10 NM, lower magnification ND in the Modified Conventional Display
which also did not include the specially designed display of relative path of the intruding airplane. The
analysis of variance of the questionnaire responses to the question addressing the usefulness of informa-
tion in the ND supported the conclusion that the pilots preferred the Enhanced Display format.
The pilots commented that the proposed procedures and displays for conducting the parallel ran-
way approaches were highly acceptable to them. They commented that they could adequately perform
the required procedures for either approach spacing and with either display format. They did make a
number of specific recommendations for improving the displays. These included bringing the display
of the escape turn direction into the PFD and providing escape maneuver guidance in the PFD, in partic-
ular, through the flight director command bars. They also commented that a coupled approach is more
likely to be certified and recommended that the AILS process should be investigated in such an
implementation.
The effects on miss distance of the relative speed of the intruder, runway spacing (3400 or
2500 feet) and the conflict geometry were found to be statistically significant factors; however, their
effects were minimized by the performance of the alerting algorithms. None of the independent vari-
ables of the test resulted in statistically significant differences in pilot reaction times.
In terms of path tracking performance, 99.98 percent of the recorded measurements were within
the +250-foot one-dot localizer width defined for this concept. Only one pilot deviated beyond that lat-
eral path width during the flights.
It is concluded that the AILS process for conducting parallel runway operations in IMC is prom-
ising and that particular issues should be addressed to make the process suitable for application in the
field. The issues include:
1. This study has shown that a set of procedures and displays is sufficient; however, all information
provided may not be necessary. The cost of implementing each aspect of the technology must be
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considered in a practical system. This issue is also important in considering retrofitting older-
technology, electromechanical flight decks.
2. Does the process work equally well in an autopilot coupled approach?
3. The issues of disconnecting from the autopilot and executing the break-off maneuver should be
studied in a variety of certified aircraft simulators.
4. What is the role of ATC in the AILS concept?
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Appendix A
Generating the Recorded Intruder Profiles
The intruder path profiles were prerecorded in digital files. These files were based on the simulated
flights flown in a manual mode in the same atmospheric conditions used in the tests, light turbulence,
and a 10-knot crosswind. Prerecorded flights were made with the intruder track deviation prescribed by
each of the seven scenarios of the test. The data in the files were manually manipulated to accomplish
the requirements for each data run. This was completed during the period that the experiment was set
up, prior to the start of all testing. A total of 896 (7 scenarios × 2 speeds × 2 altitudes × 2 sides × 16 sub-
jects) intruder path files were generated to support the tests. An example of how the scenarios were set
up is illustrated in a step by step manner in figure A1. Figure A2 presents additional details of the pro-
cess when the intruder crossing is 1500 feet ahead of the primary test airplane.
The process included the following steps (see fig. A1):
1. Record the time history profile of the traffic airplane with experienced pilots flying the simulator
to prescribed tracks. This included the seven paths illustrated in figure 15 at both intruder
speeds. These runs were recorded for operation to the closest sync point to the runway threshold,
i.e. the longest path length, and a run was recorded with the intruder airplane erring from a path
on the left runway and one from the path to the right runway.
2. Record pilot flown tracks for the own airplane to be used (only) in setting up the intruder scenar-
ios. These tracks were not used in the actual tests, but were necessary as a template for setting
up the encounter scenarios.
. Select four sync points at which the specified encounter conditions (path crossings) would exist.
These are longitudinal distances of the intruder airplane from the runway threshold at which the
nominal encounter would take place if no evasion maneuver is executed by the primary test air-
plane. The points selected were 1.0, 2.3, 3.7, and 5.0 NM from the runway threshold. In each
test run involving an intrusion incident, the intruder airplane crossed the path of the primary air-
plane at one of these longitudinal distances. Different sync points were included so that it would
not be obvious to the test subject where the intrusion incident would take place.
4. For each encounter run, select a sync point and plot the path of the intruder airplane (from step 1
above) and the own airplane (from step 2 above) and match points so that the intruder is at the
appropriate location relative to the own airplane. For the sync points more distant from the run-
way threshold, some of the straight in portion of the intruder path data was discarded to appro-
priately adjust the longitudinal path lengths. Each record in the intruder file included the state
information of the intruder airplane and the corresponding location of the own airplane to be
used as an index for reading the file and coupling correctly to the location of the own airplane.
. When the runs did not include a path crossing incident, the longitudinal paths of the two simu-
lated airplanes were coupled so that they both were longitudinally at the sync point distance
from the runway threshold simultaneously.
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In thereal-timeoperation,thepositionof theparalleltrafficairplane(intruder)wascoupledto that
of theprimarytestairplaneuntila levelthreealertwasissued uetoanintrusionincident.Thelongitu-
dinalpositionremainedcoupledthroughouttheentirerunwhennointruderwarningwasinitiated.Dur-
ing the operation,until a level threewarningwas initiated,the paralleltraffic positioncontrol
algorithms(facilitatingthesimulation)readthereal-timelongitudinallocationof theprimarytestair-
plane(ownship)asflownbythepilottestsubject.Thealgorithmthenusedthatlongitudinalpositionof
theownshipastheindextoreadfromtheprerecordedintruderfile createdinstep4above.Thecorre-
spondingpositioncoordinatesandotherstateinformation(time,heading,bank,airspeed)oftheintruder
airplanewereread,accordingtotheownshiplongitudinalindex.Thesimulationdisplaysoftwarethen
presentedtheintruderattheappropriatenominaldynamictestlocationsandstatesasdeterminedfrom
theprerecordedfile. Lateraldeviationsof theprimarytestairplanefromitsnominalpathwereignored
in theprocessfor determiningthepositionof thetrafficairplane.Whenthelevelthree(red)alertwas
initiated,theintruderlocationwasuncoupledfromthatof theownshipandtheintrudertrafficcontin-
uedon its prerecordedpath,basedontimeincrements.Theownshipwasexpectedto maneuverto
safetystartingatthatpoint.
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Figure A2. Intruder position as a function of intruder distance from the encounter sync point. TPG's used prere-
corded simulator flights.
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Appendix B
• A list of the comments made on the form, grouped by pilot number.
Pilot responses to the questionnaire are presented on the following pages.
summary of the background of the pilot subjects.
Table B 1. Subject Pilots' Background.
This appendix consists of three aspects of the pilot debriefing questionnaire session:
• The questionnaire form as it was given to the pilots.
A compilation of the pilots responses on the form presented on the modified form.
Table B 1 provides a
Total
Pilot Flight Current
number Affiliation Hours Aircraft Other Aircraft Experience
1 Capt. US Air 8,400 Fk-100 B757, 767, 737, 727, C-130
2 Capt. US Air 13,000 DC-9 B737, 727, C-130
3 Capt. US Air 13,500 Fkl00 MD-80, B-737, BAC 1-11, Lear Jet
4 Capt. US Air 22,000 B767/57 B737, DC-9, F-227-500C, DHC-6
5 F.O. AAL 3,600 B727 T37, T38, B52
6 F.O. AAL 12,000 C141A&B B727-200, B767-200&300, B757
7 F.O. AAL 6,000 B767/757 MD80, B727, F14, F5/T38, F8, A4
8 F.O. UAL 5,000 B727 T28, C-152, Piper Warrior, F-15, T38
9 F.O. AAL 7,167 MD-80 B757/67, PA-44-180, A4, OV- 10, AV-8
10 Capt. AAL 15,000 B767/77 A300, DC-10, MD-80, B727, Lear 25
11 F.O. UAL 5,000 B737-300/500 T-1A, E-4B(747), KC-135, T38, CT-39
12 Capt. AAL 10,500 B767/757 DC9-80/83, B737-100/200/300, KC-10
13 Capt. US Air 9,000 B757/767 FK-100, B737-300/300/400, DC-9/MD80
14 Capt. UPS 7,500 B757 B727, B737, T-39, C-130
15 F.O. UAL 5,325 B767/757 DC-10, B727, S-2F, T-33
16 F.O. AAL 13,000 B767/757 B727, B737, CV-580, T-38
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Pilot Debriefing Questionnaire
Name:
Mailing Address:
Phone no:
Piloting Experience:
Aircraft Type: No. of hours
30
Part 1 -- Exploded View Display (2 NM display range) 3400ft. Runway spacing
Please provide your opinion and evaluations of the 2 NM range navigation display and parallel
traffic information presented in that display setup when flying the 3400ft. runway spacing
The Parallel Traffic Display
1. During the localizer capture, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
2. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the
ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
3. Overall, I found the navigation display of traffic in this mode
a. distracting b. of little help c. somewhat helpful d. quite helpful e. essential
4. The additional workload associated with using the parallel traffic display was
a. very high b. somewhat high c. moderate d. low e. not noticeable
The Out of the Window View
5. During the localizer capture phase of the simulated flights, I looked out of the window for
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
6. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked out of the window for the adjacent
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
7. During the evasion maneuver, I looked out of the window
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
8. After the evasion maneuver was completed, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
Alerts
9. Was the time available after the alert was given adequate to maneuver to safety?
a. inadequate b. somewhat inadequate c. about right d. somewhat excessive e. highly
excessive
10. The alphanumeric "Turn Climb" presented in the Primary Flight Display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
11. The "Turn Climb, Turn Climb" computer-driven voice message spoken during the alert was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
Intruder Aircraft Predicted Path Information
12. On receiving the intruder alert, did you look at any information in the displays before
making a turning or climbing control input?
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a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
13. Wasacquiringinformationontheprobablepathof theintruderimportantin avoidinga
collision?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
14. Wasthedisplayof thepredictedpathof theintruderhelpfultoyouin decidingwhetherto
maneuver?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
15. Wasthedisplayof thepredictedpathof theintruderhelpfulin determiningthenatureof the
maneuveryouexecuted?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
16. I wouldrecommendthattherelativepathdisplayshowingthepredictedpathof theintruder
be(given)
a.eliminatedb. majorsmods c.minormods d.keptasis 16a.suggestroodson
back
[Part 1 cont. -- Exploded View Display (2 NM display range) 3400ft. Runway spacing ]
17. Were there instances that you felt that in an actual flight situation you would not have
followed the procedures as directed, because of the information presented.
a. Always agreed with the display and procedure b. occasionally I felt I would have broken off
when no red alert was given c. occasionally I felt that a red alert was given when it was not
clear that a break off was necessary.
Comment:
18. Please suggest any modifications you feel would improve the displays and procedures.
Space for additional comments on any of the previous questions and any other observations on
this portion of the experiment:
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Part 2 -- Exploded view (2 NM display range) 2500 ft. Runway spacing
Please provide your opinion and evaluations of the 2 NM range navigation display and parallel
traffic information presented in that display setup when flying the 2500ft. runway spacing.
The Parallel Traffic Display
1. During the localizer capture, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
2. During the straight in portion of the approach, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the
ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
3. Overall, I found the navigation display of traffic in this mode
a. distracting b. of little help c. somewhat helpful d. quite helpful e. essential
4. The additional workload associated with using the parallel traffic display was
a. very high b. somewhat high c. moderate d. low e. not noticeable
The Out of the Window View
5. During the localizer capture phase, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
6. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked out of the window for the adjacent
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
7. During the evasion maneuver, I looked out of the window
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
8. After the evasion maneuver was completed, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
Alerts
9. Was the time available after the alert was given adequate to maneuver to safety?
a. inadequate b. somewhat inadequate c. about right d. somewhat excessive e. highly
excessive
10. The alphanumeric "Turn Climb" presented in the Primary Flight Display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
11. The "Turn Climb" computer-driven voice message spoken during the alert was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
Intruder Predicted Path Information
12. On receiving the intruder alert, did you look at any information in the displays before
making a turning or climbing control input?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
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13. Wasacquiringinformationontheprobablepathof theintruderimportantin avoidinga
collision?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
14. Wasthedisplayof thepredictedpathof theintruderhelpfultoyouin decidingwhetherto
maneuver?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
15. Wasthedisplayof thepredictedpathof theintruderhelpfulin determiningthenatureof the
maneuveryouexecuted?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
16. I wouldrecommendthattherelativepathdisplayshowingthepredictedpathof theintruder
be(given)
a.eliminatedb. majormods c.minormods d.keptasis 16a.suggest roods on back
[Part 2 cont. -- Exploded view (2 NM display range) 2500ft. Runway spacing ]
17. Were there instances that you felt that in an actual flight situation you would not have
followed the procedures as directed, because of the information presented.
a. Always agreed with the display and procedure b. occasionally I felt I would have broken off
when no red alert was given c. occasionally I felt that a red alert was given when it was not
clear that a break off was necessary.
Comment:
18. Please suggest any modifications you feel would improve the displays and procedures.
Space for additional comments on any of the previous questions and any other observations on
this portion of the experiment:
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Part 3 -- Wide field view (10 NM display range) 3400ft. Runway spacing
Please provide your opinion and evaluations of the 10 nm range navigation display and parallel
traffic information presented in that display setup when flying the 3400ft. runway spacing.
The Parallel Traffic Display
1. During the localizer capture, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
2. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the
ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
3. Overall, I found the navigation display of traffic in this mode
a. distracting b. of little help c. somewhat helpful d. quite helpful e. essential
4. The additional workload associated with using the parallel traffic display was
a. very high b. somewhat high c. moderate d. low e. not noticeable
The Out of the Window View
5. During the localizer capture phase, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
6. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked out of the window for the adjacent
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
7. During the evasion maneuver, I looked out of the window
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
8. After the evasion maneuver was completed, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
Alerts
9. Was the time available after the alert was given adequate to maneuver to safety?
a. inadequate b. somewhat inadequate c. about right d. somewhat excessive
e. highly excessive
10. The alphanumeric "Turn Climb" presented in the Primary Flight Display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
11. The "Turn Climb" computer-driven voice message spoken during the alert was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
Intruder Path Information
12. On receiving the intruder alert, did you look at any information in the displays before
making a turning or climbing control input?
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a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
13. Wasacquiringinformationonthepathof theintruderanimportantstepin avoidinga
collision?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
14. Wasthedisplayof theintruderhelpfulto youin decidingwhetherto maneuver?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
15. Wasthedisplayof theintruderhelpfulindeterminingthenatureof themaneuveryou
executed?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
Part 3 cont. -- Wide field view (10 NM display range) 3400ft. Runway spacing
16. Were there instances that you felt that in an actual flight situation you would not have
followed the procedures as directed, because of the information presented.
a. Always agreed with the display and procedure b. occasionally I felt I would have broken off
when no red alert was given c. occasionally I felt that a red alert was given when it was not
clear that a break off was necessary.
comment:
17. Please suggest any modifications you feel would improve the displays and procedures.
Space for additional comments on any of the previous questions and any other observations on
this portion of the experiment:
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Part 4 -- Wide field view (10 NM display range) 2500ft. Runway spacing
Please provide your opinion and evaluations of the 10 NM range navigation display and parallel
traffic information presented in that display setup when flying the 2500ft. runway spacing.
The Parallel Traffic Display
1. During the localizer capture, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
2. During the approach, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
3. Overall, I found the navigation display of traffic in this mode
a. distracting b. of little help c. somewhat helpful d. quite helpful e. essential
4. The additional workload associated with using the parallel traffic display was
a. very high b. somewhat high c. moderate d. low e. not noticeable
The Out of the Window View
5. During the localizer capture phase, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
6. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked out of the window for the adjacent
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
7. During the evasion maneuver, I looked out of the window
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
8. After the evasion maneuver was completed, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
Alerts
9. Was the time available after the alert was given adequate to maneuver to safety?
a. inadequate b. somewhat inadequate c. about right d. somewhat excessive
e. highly excessive
10. The alphanumeric "Turn Climb" presented in the Primary Flight Display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
11. The "Turn Climb" computer-driven voice message spoken during the alert was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
Intruder Path Information
12. On receiving the intruder alert, did you look at any information in the displays before
making a turning or climbing control input?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
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13. Wasacquiringinformationonthepathof theintruderimportantin avoidingacollision?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
14. Wasthedisplayof theintruderhelpfulto youin decidingwhetherto maneuver?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
15. Wasthedisplayof theintruderhelpfulindeterminingthenatureof themaneuveryou
executed?
a.never b.rarely c.occasionally d.frequently e.always
[Part 4 cont. -- Wide field view (10 NM display range) 2500ft. Runway spacing ]
16. Were there instances that you felt that in an actual flight situation you would not have
followed the procedures as directed because of the information presented.
a. Always agreed with the display and procedure b. occasionally I felt I would have broken off
when no red alert was given c. occasionally I felt that a red alert was given when it was not
clear that a break off was necessary.
comments:
17. Please suggest any modifications you feel would improve the displays and procedures.
Space for additional comments on any of the previous questions and any other observations on
this portion of the experiment:
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Part 5-- The Simulator
Please provide your evaluation of the simulator and its appropriateness for" evaluating pilot
performance in the tasks with the display innovations and procedures presented in these tests.
Also, please keep in mind that this simulator is a research facility and not a training simulator.
The Simulator
1. I found the fidelity of the simulator in terms of allowing an accurate evaluation of my
performance of the task?
a. unacceptable b. somewhat adequate c. adequate d. favorable e. highly favorable
2. The fidelity of the simulator biased my performance of the task compared to that in flight as
follows:
3. a. grossly degraded b. slightly degraded c. no difference d. slightly improved e. grossly
improved
3. I have on occasions operated as a pilot in a part-task simulator of somewhat similar fidelity
a. never b. once before c. on a number of occasions
The Flight Controls (referencing a medium transport of the Boeing 737 class)
4. The manual control mode used in the tests was
a. unacceptable b. somewhat adequate c. adequate d. favorable e. highly favorable
5. The response of the simulated airplane to roll control inputs was
a. very low b. slightly low c. about right d. slightly high e. excessively high
6. The response of the simulated airplane to pitch control inputs was
a. very low b. slightly low c. about right d. slightly high e. excessively high
7. The climbing performance of the simulated airplane was
a. very low b. slightly low c. about right d. slightly high e. excessively high
The Control Actuator Levers
8. I found use of the side stick controller
a. unacceptable b. somewhat adequate c. adequate d. favorable e. highly favorable
9. How long did it take you to feel comfortable with the side stick controller?
a. almost immediately b. Less than 5 rain. c. Less than 30 minutes d. an hour or more
e. never did
The Flight Displays
10. The flight displays provided the information I needed in a manner I would describe as
a. unacceptable b. somewhat adequate c. adequate d. favorable e. highly favorable
11. In terms of the tasks required in this test, the flight director roll command was
a. unacceptable b. somewhat adequate c. adequate d. favorable e. highly favorable
12. In terms of the tasks required in this test, the flight director pitch command was
a. unacceptable b. somewhat adequate c. adequate d. favorable e. highly favorable
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13. Theout-of-the-windowscenewas
a.not relevant b. somewhatrelevant c.noopinion d.somewhatnecessarye.essential
14. In termsof thetaskrequiredin thistest,the fidelity of theout-of-the-windowscenewas
a.unacceptableb. somewhatadequatec.adequated. favorable e.highlyfavorable
Look Point Tracking
15. Was your performance during the evasion maneuver hampered by the eye tracking
equipment?
a. not at all b. very little c. somewhat d. considerably
16. Did the eye tracking equipment interfere with your ability to perform any of the required
task?
a. not at all b. very little c. somewhat d. considerably
Comment:
Part 6 -- Miscellaneous
Please provide your evaluation on the aspects addressed below
The Localizer Sensitivity
1. The difficulty of capturing the localizer compared to conventional ILS operations was
a. much more b. somewhat more c. about the same d. slightly less e. significantly less
2. The difficulty of flying the localizer after capture, compared to conventional ILS, was
a. much more b. somewhat more c. about the same d. slightly less e. significantly less
3. Immediately after localizer capture, prior to glideslope capture, the sensitivity of the localizer
was
a. much too low b. a little too low c. just about right d. a little too high e. much too high
4. After glideslope capture the sensitivity of the localizer was
a. much too low b. a little too low c. just about right d. a little too high e. much too high
Special Display Features
5. The "break-off" heading bug (the barber pole striped red and white indicator) in the
navigation display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
6. Retracting the flight director command bars when break-off alerts were given was
a. distracting b. no help c.somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. essential for safe
operation
Other special features related to the parallel runway operation
7. The escape maneuver was
a. highly favorable b. favorable c. adequate d. somewhat adequate e. unacceptable
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8. Thefactthattheescapemaneuverresultedin abelly-upconditionwas
a.unacceptableb.somewhatof concernc.of noconcernd. favorablee.highlyfavorable
9. My opinionof theaccelerating,turning,climbingprocedureusedfor escape,in therealworld
it wouldbe
a.highlyfavorableb.favorable c.adequated. somewhatobjectionablee.unacceptable
10. In my opinion,thefactthatthepilot wasnotexpectedto selectedamaneuveranddirection
to avoidanintruderwas
a.highlyfavorableb.favorable c.adequated. somewhatobjectionablee.unacceptable
11. Theonedotlocalizeralertwasdesignedinto theconcept.My opinionis thatthisfeature
was
a.unacceptableb. somewhatobjectionablec.adequated.favorablee.highlyfavorable
12. Thetwodot localizeralertrequiringabreakoffof theapproachwasin myopinion
a.unacceptableb.somewhatobjectionablec.adequated. favorablee.highly favorable
13. Therelativepathvectorpresentingtheprojectedpathof theintruderrelativeto myown
projectedpathwas
a.highlyfavorableb.favorable c.adequated. somewhatobjectionablee.unacceptable
14. Comparedto amoreconventionalpathvectorshowingtheprojectedgroundtrackof the
intruder,myopinionis thattherelativepathvectorpresentationwas
a.highlyfavorableb.favorable c.adequated. somewhatadequatee.unacceptable
15. In my opinionpresentingamoreconventionalprojectedgroundtrackof theintruderinstead
of therelativepathinformationwouldbe
a.unacceptableb.somewhatobjectionablec.adequated. favorablee.highly favorable
Thisspaceisprovided for additional comments on any earlier questions or any other
aspect of the experiment.
Part I -- Exploded View Display (2 NM display range) 3400ft. Runway spacing
Please provide your opinion and evaluations of the 2 NM range navigation display and parallel
traffic information presented in that display setup when flying the 3400ft. runway spacing
The Parallel Traffic Display
1. During the localizer capture, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,3,5,6 2,9 c. 4,7,8,10,12,13,14 11,15,16 e.b. d.
2. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the
ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. c. 2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,14 1,7,11,12,13,15,16 e.b. 3 d.
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3. Overall, I foundthenavigationdisplayof traffic in thismode
a.distractingb. of littlehelp c. somewhathelpful d. quitehelpful e.essential
a. b. c. 3,10,13,9 d. 1,2,5 6,7,8,11,12,15,16 e. 4,14
4. The additional workload associated with using the parallel traffic display was
a. very high b. somewhat high c. moderate d. low e. not noticeable
a. b. 7,10 c. 1,5,11,12,15 d. 2,3,4,6,8,14,16 e. 9,13
The Out-of-the-Window View
5. During the localizer capture phase of the simulated flights, I looked out of the window for
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,2,3,4,5,6,9,10,13,14 7,8,11,12,15 c. e.b. d. 16
6. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked out of the window for the adjacent
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
a. 1,2,4,5,6,9,10,13,14 b. 7,8,11,12,15,16 c. 3 d. e.
7. During the evasion maneuver, I looked out of the window
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 3,4,5,6,9,10,12,13,14,16 1,2,7,8,11,15 c. e.b. d.
8. After the evasion maneuver was completed, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,2,3,4,5,9,10,14,16 6,7,8,11,12,13 c. e.b. d. 15
Alerts
9. Was the time available after the alert was given adequate to maneuver to safety?
a. inadequate b. somewhat inadequate c. about right d. somewhat excessive e. highly
excessive
a. b. c. 1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,10,12,13,15,16 d. 2,14
e.
10. The alphanumeric "Turn Climb" presented in the Primary Flight Display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
I a. c. 8,10,14 1,6,7,9 e. 2,3,4,5,11,12,13,15,16b. d.
11. The "Turn Climb, Turn Climb" computer-driven voice message spoken during the alert was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
I a. c. 5,6,8 1,2,3,7,9,12,14 e. 4,11,10,13,15,16b. d.
Intruder Aircraft Predicted Path Information
12. On receiving the intruder alert, did you look at any information in the displays before
making a turning or climbing control input?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
I a. 3,5,6,8,10,11,12,13,15 2,4,9,14,16 c. e.b. 7 d. 1
13. Was acquiring information on the probable path of the intruder important in avoiding a
collision?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
I a. 2,8 9,13,14 c. 3,5,6,7,10,12 1,7,16 e. 4,11,15b. d.
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14. Was the display of the predicted path of the intruder helpful to you in deciding whether to
maneuver?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
a. 2,4,5,6,8,11,10,15 9,14 c. 3,12,13 1,7,16 e. ]b. d.
15. Was the display of the predicted path of the intruder helpful in determining the nature of the
maneuver you executed?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
[ a. 2,10,11,14 b. 9,13,16 c. 3,5,6,12 d. 1,8 e. 4,7,15 ]
16. I would recommend that the relative path display showing the predicted path of the intruder
be (given)
a. eliminated b. majors roods c. minor roods d. kept as is
16a. suggest rnods on back
a. 13 b. c. 3,8,15 d. 1,2,4,5,6,9,10,11,12,14,16 e. ]
[Part l cont.-- Exploded View Display (2 NM display range) 3400ft. Runway spacing ]
17. Were there instances that you felt that in an actual flight situation you would not have
followed the procedures as directed, because of the information presented.
a. Always agreed with the display and procedure b. occasionally I felt I would have broken off
when no red alert was given c. occasionally I felt that a red alert was given when it was not
clear that a break off was necessary.
[ a. 1,2,4,6,10,11,12,13,14,15 b. 3,5,7,8,9,16 c. d. e. ]
Comment:
18. Please suggest any modifications you feel would improve the displays and procedures.
Space for additional comments on any of the previous questions and any other observations on
this portion of the experiment:
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Part 2 -- Exploded view (2 NM display range) 2500 ft. Runway spacing
Please provide your opinion and evaluations of the 2 NM range navigation display and parallel
traffic information presented in that display setup when flying the 2500ft. runway spacing.
The Parallel Traffic Display
1. During the localizer capture, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
a. 3,5 b. 2,6,9 c. 1,4,7 ,8,13,14,15 d. 10,11,12,16
e.
2. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the
ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. c. 2,3,5,6,8,9,10,13,14 1,7,11,12,15,16 e.b. 4 d.
3. Overall, I found the navigation display of traffic in this mode
a. distracting b. of little help c. somewhat helpful d. quite helpful e. essential
I a. c. 3,6,9 1,2,5,7,8,10,12,13,14,15,16 e. ,4,11b. d.
4. The additional workload associated with using the parallel traffic display was
a. very high b. somewhat high c. moderate d. low e. not noticeable
I a. b. 7 c. 1,4,5,10,11,12,15 d. 2,3,6,8,9,14,16 e. 13
The Out-of-the-Window View
5. During the localizer capture phase, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a 1,2,3,4,6,9,10,13,14 b. 5,7,8,11,12,15,16 c. d. e.
6. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked out of the window for the adjacent
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a 1,2,3,4,9,10,14 b. 6,7,8,11,12,13,15,16 c. 5 d. e.
7. During the evasion maneuver, I looked out of the window
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a 1,2,3,4,5,6,9,12,13,14,16 b. 7,8,10,11,15 c. d. e.
8. After the evasion maneuver was completed, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,2,3,4,6,9,10,13,14,16 c. 7,5,8,15 e.b. 11 d.
Alerts
9. Was the time available after the alert was given adequate to maneuver to safety?
a. inadequate b. somewhat inadequate c. about right d. somewhat excessive
e. highly excessive
I a. b. c. 1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,15,16 d. 2,14 e.
10. The alphanumeric "Turn Climb" presented in the Primary Flight Display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
a. b. c. 6,8,10,14 d. 1,7,9 e. 2,3,4,5,11,12,13,15,16
11. The "Turn Climb" computer-driven voice message spoken during the alert was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
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I a. c. 5,6,8 1,2,3,7,9,10,12,14 e. 4,11,13,15,16b. d.
Intruder Predicted Path Information
12. On receiving the intruder alert, did you look at any information in the displays before
making a turning or climbing control input?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
I a. 3,5,6,8,10,13 2,4,9,11,14,16 c. 7,12 e.b. d. 1 15
13. Was acquiring information on the probable path of the intruder important in avoiding a
collision?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
a. 2,8,9 b. 13,14 e. 3,5,6,11 d. 7,10,12,16 e. 1,4,15
14. Was the display of the predicted path of the intruder helpful to you in deciding whether to
maneuver?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
I a. 2,4,5,6,8,9,10,11 c. 3,13,14,15 7,12,16 e.b. d. 1
15. Was the display of the predicted path of the intruder helpful in determining the nature of the
maneuver you executed?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
I a. 2,3,5,9,11,12,16 6,14 c. ,13 4,7,8,10 e. 1,15b. d.
16. I would recommend that the relative path display showing the predicted path of the intruder
be (given)
a. eliminated b. major mods c. minor mods d. kept as is 16a. suggest mods on back
I a. c. 4,8,10,15 1,2,3,5,6,7,9,11,12,13,14,16 e.b. d.
Part 2 cont. -- Exploded view (2 NM display range) 2500ft. Runway spacing
17. Were there instances that you felt that in an actual flight situation you would not have
followed the procedures as directed, because of the information presented.
a. Always agreed with the display and procedure b. occasionally I felt I would have broken off
when no red alert was given c. occasionally I felt that a red alert was given when it was not
clear that a break off was necessary.
a. 1,3,6,10,11,12,13,14 b. 2,4,5,7,8,9,16 c. 15 d. e.
Comment."
18. Please suggest any modifications you feel would improve the displays and procedures.
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Spacefor additionalcommentsonanyof thepreviousquestionsandanyotherobservationson
thisportionof theexperiment:
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Part 3 -- Wide field view (10 NM display range) 3400ft. Runway spacing
Please provide your opinion and evaluations of the 10 NM range navigation display and parallel
traffic information presented in that display setup when flying the 3400ft. runway spacing.
The Parallel Traffic Display
1. During the localizer capture, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,3 b. 2,5,9,10,14 c. 6,8,11,12,13,15 d. 4,7,16 e.
2. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the
ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. b. 9 c. 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,10,13,14,15,16 d. 7,11,12 e.
3. Overall, I found the navigation display of traffic in this mode
a. distracting b. of little help c. somewhat helpful d. quite helpful e. essential
I a. b. 5,9,14 c. 1,2,3,6,7,10,12 d. 4,8,11,13,15,16 e.
4. The additional workload associated with using the parallel traffic display was
a. very high b. somewhat high c. moderate d. low e. not noticeable
a. b. 5 c. 1,9,10,12,13,14,15 d. 2,3,4,6,7,8,11,16 e.
The Out-of-the-Window View
5. During the localizer capture phase, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
a. 1,2,3,4,5,6,9,10,13,14 b. 8,11,12,15 c. 7,16
e.
do
6. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked out of the window for the adjacent
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
a. 2,3,4,5,9,10,13,14,16 b. 1,6,8,11,15 c. 7,12 d.
e.
7. During the evasion maneuver, I looked out of the window
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,12,14,16 ,11,13,15 c. e.b. 7 d.
8. After the evasion maneuver was completed, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,13,14,16 7,11,12 c. e.b. d. 15
Alerts
9. Was the time available after the alert was given adequate to maneuver to safety?
a. inadequate b. somewhat inadequate c. about right d. somewhat excessive
e. highly excessive
I a. c. 1,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,15,16 2,12,14 e.b. 4 d.
10. The alphanumeric "Turn Climb" presented in the Primary Flight Display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
I a. c. 8,14 1,4,7,9,10 e. 2,3,5,6,11,12,13,15,16b. d.
11. The "Turn Climb" computer-driven voice message spoken during the alert was
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a.distractingb.nohelp c. somewhathelpful d. veryhelpful e.absolutelyessential
a. c. 1,2,4,5,7,8,9,10,12,14 e. 3,11,13,15,16b. 6 d.
Intruder Path Information
12. On receiving the intruder alert, did you look at any information in the displays before
making a turning or climbing control input?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
] a. 3,4,5,6,8,9,10,11,13,15,16 b. 1,2,12,14 c. 7 d. e.
13. Was acquiring information on the path of the intruder an important step in avoiding a
collision?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
a. 2,6,8,9,11,13 b. 3,4,5,12,14,16 c. d. 1,10 e. 7,15
14. Was the display of the intruder helpful to you in deciding whether to maneuver?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
] a. 6,8,9,10,11,12 b. 1,2,3,4,5,13,14 c. 16 d. e. 7,15
15. Was the display of the intruder helpful in determining the nature of the maneuver you
executed?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
] a. 2,5,6,8,9,10,11,12,13,15,16 b. 1,3,14 c. 4 d. 7 e.
Part 3 cont. -- Wide field view (10 NM display range) 3400ft. Runway spacing
16. Were there instances that you felt that in an actual flight situation you would not have
followed the procedures as directed, because of the information presented.
a. Always agreed with the display and procedure b. occasionally I felt I would have broken off
when no red alert was given c. occasionally I felt that a red alert was given when it was not
clear that a break off was necessary.
comment:
] a. 1,2,3,5,6,7,10,11,12,13,14,15 b. 4,8,9,16 c. d. e.
17. Please suggest any modifications you feel would improve the displays and procedures.
Space for additional comments on any of the previous questions and any other observations on
this portion of the experiment:
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Part 4 -- Wide field view (10 NM display range) 2500ft. Runway spacing
Please provide your opinion and evaluations of the 10 nm range navigation display and parallel
traffic information presented in that display setup when flying the 2500ft. runway spacing.
The Parallel Traffic Display
1. During the localizer capture, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,3 b. 2,4,5,6,7,9,12 c. 8,10,11,13,14,15,16 d. e.
2. During the approach, I looked at the adjacent-traffic display in the ND
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 3,9 c. 2,4,5,6,8,10,12,14,15,16 1,7,11,13 e.b. d.
3. Overall, I found the navigation display of traffic in this mode
a. distracting b. of little help c. somewhat helpful d. quite helpful e. essential
a. 9 b. 2,3,5 c. 1,6,8,12,13,14,15,16 d. 4,7,10,11
e.
4. The additional workload associated with using the parallel traffic display was
a. very high b. somewhat high c. moderate d. low e. not noticeable
I a. c. 1,7,8,10,12,14,15 2,3,6,11,16 e. 4,135 b. 9 d.
The Out-of-the-Window View
5. During the localizer capture phase, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
a. 1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10,13,14 b. 4,6,11,12,15 c. 16 d. e.
6. During the straight-in portion of the approach, I looked out of the window for the adjacent
traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 4,5,9,10,13,14 2,3,7,11,12,16 c. 1,6,8,15 e.b. d.
7. During the evasion maneuver, I looked out of the window
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,10,12,13,14,16 8,11,15 c. e.b. d.
8. After the evasion maneuver was completed, I looked out of the window for traffic
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. continually
I a. 1,2,3,4,5,6,9,10,14,16 b. 11,12,13 c. 7,8 d. 15 e.
Alerts
9. Was the time available after the alert was given adequate to maneuver to safety?
a. inadequate b. somewhat inadequate c. about right d. somewhat excessive
e. highly excessive
I a. c. 1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,15,16 2,12,14 e.b. d.
10. The alphanumeric "Turn Climb" presented in the Primary Flight Display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
I a. b. c. 8,14 d. 1,4,7,9,10 e. 2,3,5,6,11,12,13,15,16
11. The "Turn Climb" computer-driven voice message spoken during the alert was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
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a. c. 6,8 1,2,5,7,9,10,12,14 e. 3,4,11,13,15,16 ]b. d.
Intruder Path Information
12. On receiving the intruder alert, did you look at any information in the displays before
making a turning or climbing control input?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
[ a. 2,3,5,6,8,10,11,12,15,16 b. 4,9,13,14 c. 1 d. 7 e. ]
13. Was acquiring information on the path of the intruder important in avoiding a collision?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
[ a. 2,3,5,6,8,9,13,14 b. 4,11,12,14,16 c. d. 1,7,10 e. 15 ]
14. Was the display of the intruder helpful to you in deciding whether to maneuver?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
[ a. 2,3,5,8,9,10,11,12,13,15 b. 6,14,16 c. 7 d. 1,4 e. ]
15. Was the display of the intruder helpful in determining the nature of the maneuver you
executed?
a. never b. rarely c. occasionally d. frequently e. always
[ a. 2,3,5,8,9,11,12,13,14,15 b. 4,6,16 c. d. 1,7,10 e. ]
[Part 4 cont. -- Wide field view (10 NM display range) 2500 ft. Runway spacing ]
16. Were there instances that you felt that in an actual flight situation you would not have
followed the procedures as directed because of the information presented.
a. Always agreed with the display and procedure b. occasionally I felt I would have broken off
when no red alert was given c. occasionally I felt that a red alert was given when it was not
clear that a break off was necessary.
comments:
a. 1,3,6,7,11,12,13,14,15 b. 4,5,8,9,10,16 c. d. e. ]
17. Please suggest any modifications you feel would improve the displays and procedures.
Space for additional comments on any of the previous questions and any other observations on
this portion of the experiment:
5O
Part 5 -- The Simulator
Please provide your evaluation of the simulator and its appropriateness for" evaluating pilot
performance in the tasks with the display innovations and procedures presented in these tests.
Also, please keep in mind that this simulator is a research facility and not a training simulator.
The Simulator
1. I found the fidelity of the simulator in terms of allowing an accurate evaluation of my
performance of the task?
a. unacceptable b. somewhat adequate c. adequate d. favorable e. highly favorable
a. c. 9,14 1,2,3,4,5,7,10,13,15,16 e. 11,126 b. 8 d.
2. The fidelity of the simulator biased my performance of the task compared to that in flight as
follows
a. grossly degraded b. slightly degraded c. no difference d. slightly improved
e. grossly improved
a. b. 3,4,10,14,16 c. 2,6,7,11,13,15 d. 1,5,9,12 e. 8
3. I have on occasions operated as a pilot in a part-task simulator of somewhat similar fidelity
a. never b. once before c. on a number of occasions
a. 5,7,15,16 3,14 c. 1,2,4,6,8,9,10,11,12,13b.
The Flight Controls (referencing a medium transport of the Boeing 737 class)
4. The manual control mode used in the tests was
a. unacceptable b. somewhat adequate c. adequate d. favorable e. highly favorable
a. b. 4,10 c. 3,6,7,8,9,14,15,16 d. 2,5,1 e. 1,12,13
5. The response of the simulated airplane to roll control inputs was
a. very low b. slightly low c. about right d. slightly high e. excessively high
I a. 1,2,3,4,6,8,10,14,15 c. 7,9,11,12,13 e.16 b. d. 5
6. The response of the simulated airplane to pitch control inputs was
a. very low b. slightly low c. about right d. slightly high e. excessively high
I a. c. 1,3,4,5,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,16 2,6,8 e.b. 15 d.
7. The climbing performance of the simulated airplane was
a. very low b. slightly low c. about right d. slightly high e. excessively high
I a. 2,3,10,11,16 c. 4,5,6,7,8,9,12,13,14,15 e.b. d.
The Control Actuator Levers
8. I found use of the side stick controller
a. unacceptable b. somewhat adequate c. adequate d. favorable e. highly favorable
I a. c. 6,9 2,3,4,14,15 e. 1,5,7,8,11,12,13,16b. d.
9. How long did it take you to feel comfortable with the side stick controller?
a. almost immediately b. Less than 5 rain. c. Less than 30 minutes d. an hour or more
e. never did
I a. 1,3,4,7,11,13,16 2,5,6,8,9,15 c. ,12,14 e.b. d.
The Flight Displays
10. The flight displays provided the information I needed in a manner I would describe as
51
a. c. 1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16 e. ]b. d. 2
4. After glideslope capture the sensitivity of the localizer was
a. much too low b. a little too low c. just about right d. a little too high
e. much too high
[ a. b. c. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16 d. e. ]
Special Display Features
5. The "break-ofF' heading bug (the barber pole striped red and white indicator) in the
navigation display was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful e. absolutely essential
a. c. 3,7,8,9,10,14,15 e. 1,2,4,5,11,12,13,16b. 6 d.
6. Retracting the flight director command bars when break-off alerts were given was
a. distracting b. no help c. somewhat helpful d. very helpful
e. essential for safe operation
a. b. 1,2,6,8,10 c. 5,12,14 d. 3,4,7,13,15,16 e. 9,11
Other special features related to the parallel runway operation
7. The escape maneuver was
a. highly favorable b. favorable c. adequate d. somewhat adequate e. unacceptable
a. 5,11,12,14 b. 1,2,7,10,15 c. 3,6,9,13,16 d. 4,8 e.
8. The fact that the escape maneuver resulted in a belly-up condition was
a. unacceptable b. somewhat of concern c. of no concern d. favorable
e. highly favorable
a. b. 2,5,8,9,13 c. 1,3,4,6,7,10,11,12,14,15 d.16 eo
9. My opinion of the accelerating, turning, climbing procedure used for escape, in the real world
it would be
a. highly favorable b. favorable c. adequate d. somewhat objectionable
e. unacceptable
[ a. 5,14 b. 1,2,4,7,11,12,13,15 c. 6 d. 3,8,9,10,16 e. ]
10. In my opinion, the fact that the pilot was not expected to selected a maneuver and direction to
avoid an intruder was
a. highly favorable b. favorable c. adequate d. somewhat objectionable
e. unacceptable
[ a. 2,5,10,11,12,13 b. 1,4,6,9,14,15,16 c. 3,7 d. 8 e. ]
11. The one dot localizer alert was designed into the concept. My opinion is that this feature
was
a. unacceptable b. somewhat objectionable c. adequate d. favorable
e. highly favorable
[ a. b. c. 1,2,8 d. 3,4,5,6,7,9,10,12,14,15 e. ll,13,16 ]
12. The two dot localizer alert requiring a breakoff of the approach was in my opinion
a. unacceptable b. somewhat objectionable c. adequate d. favorable
e. highly favorable
[ a. b. 4 c. d. 1,2,7,8,9,12,14 e. 3,5,6,10,16,11,13,15 ]
13. The relative path vector presenting the projected path of the intruder relative to my own
projected path was
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a. highly favorable b. favorable c. adequate d. somewhat objectionable
e. unacceptable
a. 1,3,5,6,7,8,10,11,12,14,15,16 2,4,9,13 c. e. ]b. d.
14. Compared to a more conventional path vector showing the projected ground track of the
intruder, my opinion is that the relative path vector presentation was
a. highly favorable b. favorable c. adequate d. somewhat adequate e. unacceptable
[ a. 1,3,4,5,7,8,9,10,11,12,14,15 b. 2,6,13,16 c. d. e. ]
15. In my opinion presenting a more conventional projected ground track of the intruder instead
of the relative path information would be
a. unacceptable b. somewhat objectionable c. adequate d. favorable
e. highly favorable
[ a. 1,5,6,8,9,14,15 b.2,4,7,10,12,13 c. 3,11,16 d. e. ]
This space is provided for additional comments on any earlier questions or any other
aspect of the experiment.
Pilot Comments from the Debriefing Questionnaire Forms
Pilot # 1
Part 1 2 NM range 3400 ft rwy spacing
Q. #18
Drop the flight control movement indicator from the top right comer of the attitude display. I
don't need an indication of normal flight control movement flashing in the comer of my vision.
Part 2 2 NM range 2500 ft rwy spacing
Q.#11
"Turn, Climb" needs to be louder.
Q.# 18
On final approach there are 4 lines displayed in front of the aircraft (symbol in the ND).
I think only 2 would suffice. Say when Loc. comes in view, FMC disappears with RW CL, so
you would have one course line with the trend vector.
Part 3 10 NM range 3400 ft. rwy spacing
Q.# 17
On receiving the traffic I always looked at the nav display to see the traffic and to reaffirm in my
mind the "escape bar" was right or left turn. When I got the "turn cimb" I always focused only
on the primary flight display.
I feel the intruder aircraft should be displayed with a trend line to give the pilot an idea of where
the intruder is going.
Part 4. 10 NM range 2500 ft. rwy spacing
Q.#11
Needs to be louder
Q.#17
The smaller scale, of course, gave more information on the intruder and his/her path; however,
the larger scale was adequate. On the larger scale, I could not look at the intruder long enough to
get a trend, so a trend line on the intruder would be helpful.
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Part 5. The Simulator
Q.#13
We were IMC
Q.#16
Didn't even notice it.
Part 6. Miscellaneous
Free Space comment:
I think Flight command guidance is in order, since in glass cockpit aircraft all maneuvers like
windshear, go around, stall recovery, you are provided guidance.
Pilot #2
Part 1 2 NM range 3400 ft rwy spacing
Q.#17 There could be a situation when the intruder has passed in front or behind, therefore
changing sides. Then if he decides to get back on course could intrude again from other side
causing your escape bug to be invalid.
Q.#18
The yellow "traffic" flashes right on top of your display information for the ILS tracking - a
slight nuisance - when only a caution.
Part 2 2 NM range 2500 ft rwy spacing
Q.# 17
When traffic visually crossed in front of nose - it felt natural that if he got too close to break up
and behind him - away from bug.
Q.# 18
Just as previously noted - "Traffic" caution. (See Q.#18 Part 1)
Part 3 10 NM range 3400 ft. rwy spacing
Free space comment:
I didn't realize how much I used the better map scale yesterday (2 NM range) -- it was a great
help.
part 4
Q.# 16
Didn't always agree in that escape bug was not flexible under some unusual circumstances as
previously discussed.
Part 6. Miscellaneous
In space for additional comments:
Other than items previously mentioned, the localizer/side stick seemed a bit too sensitive to
minor inputs, but the again, I been flying "Collins wedges" and not these "Sperry X bars" lately.
So I'm used to flying the wedge and not the "dot." So I probably needed a bit more of a learning
curve.
Anyway, I felt the actual flying was a bit too sensitive.
Pilot #3
Part 1
Q.# 5, 6, 7, and 8
IMC
Q.# 18
Need guidance info in PFD. You are making an emergency maneuver, keep it simple and give
guidance on one display. 45 degrees is too quick. You are asking for full control deflection and
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a missed approach, but you want to stop at 45 degrees. Maybe a heading (line? word not clear)
45 & 90 degrees (or heading guidance on the PFD).
This display was a little confusing. It appears that he is not turning, but maneuvering completely
(word not clear). My briefing led me to expect that his projected course and position would
come from his nose.
Sketch not included
Part 4
Q.#3
With the 2.5 miles scale (10 NM) the PNF will be concerned about the traffic and this display is
insufficient to alleviate his concern. The PF is too busy concentration on this PFD, but the PNF
is not.
Q. # 4 With the 2.5 mile scale (10 NM) there is a possibility the pilot could turn the wrong way.
The expanded view gives you good situational awareness of the position of the intruder. The 2.5
scale (10 NM) the situational awareness is reduced.
Q.#5
Note: Check escape maneuver with a low engine failure (italicized words not clear) at the time
of the escape resolution.
Q.# 17
Need direction of turn on PFD - large arrow would be good.
45 degrees of turn is too quick for this radical of maneuver
Part 4
Part 1 2 NM range 3400 ft rwy spacing
Q. 4(The additional wo_load was: d. low)
Comment: After I got used to it.
Q.# 18
3D (climb and or descend information)
part 2
Q.# 16
Turn Climb descent info be given on PFD.
Part 3
q.# 17
Change range presentation from 2.5 to 1.5 miles.
part 4
Q.#16
I would have followed system but felt uncomfortable.
Q.17
Combine the upper and lower display into one large monitor.
Part 5
Q.#8
I found the side stick controller fun.
Q.# 14. The out of the window scene was (e) highly favorable
comment: runway environment
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Pilot 5
Part 1 2 NM range 3400 ft rwy spacing
Q.# 5,6,7,8
Because we were in IMC
Q.# 11 Computer voice "Climb, Turn" (response: Somewhat helpful)
Although still seemed to lag behind alphanumeric visual.
Q.# 13 (Response: occasionally)
Because it reiterated the direction of turn in my mind.
Q.# 14
Did not maneuver w/o and alert.
See #13 above for note.
Q. 17 (Response: occasionally I would have broken off when no red was given)
If in VMC I would have felt differently about continuing after an aircraft passed in front of me.
Q.# 18 (Suggest modifications)
Repeat the turn direction indicator (currently escape bug) on the PFD.
Suggestions: (i) The word "Left" or "Right" above horizon on appropriate side of PFD.
(ii) Highlight the 30 deg. bank index which would additionally stress target bank
angle.
(iii) Red shade right side of PFD? ( A bit extreme perhaps)
Part 2
Q.#4
Workload difference may be greater in (full workload) airplane.
Q.# 10
I was concentrating on the PFD already so I saw alert right away-- Aural alert seemed to have a
slight lag.
Q.# 14
I was instructed not to maneuver without an alert.
Q.# 17 (Response: Occasionally I felt I would have broken off when no red alert was given)
Comment: If I could see intruder aircraft.
Q.# 18
Give loc (localizer) display at bottom of PFD greater bias and improve/increase loc warning, i.e.
give better warning for approaching turn to loc ( capture, wo_vl not clear).
Part 3
Q.# 5,6,7,8
IMC
Q.# 12
I responded to alert immediately. I exclusively (i.e. used only) alphanumeric and voice alerts for
my response.
Q.# 13
Because I couldn't tell with the 20NM display what the intruder path was.
Q.# 14
Same note as 13 above.
Q.# 16 (Response: Always agreed with the display and procedure)
Because we were IMC. If we had been in VMC I would have broken off when aircraft passed in
front of us.
In space for additional comments:
Good use of time in sim.
Part 4
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Q.# 4 (Response: Workload very high)
Comment: Due to the scale it took a lot of looking to get the info I wanted -- where is intruder?
Where is he going?
Q.#6-8
IMC -- If VMC I would look out during 6 and 8 only (straight-in portion and evasion maneuver)
Q.# 13
I couldn't discern that info from display. Would've liked to known intruder flight path
prediction.
Q.# 14
Maneuver based solely on alphanumeric and voice alerts.
Q.# 15
Nature of maneuver based on escape bug only (no intruder).
Q.# 16 (Response: Occasionally would have broken off when no red alert given)
Traffic passing in front of us in VMC (if traffic in sight)
Q.# 17 (Suggest roods)
Go back to expanded display! (2 NM range) The extra info provided helps by (i) reaffirming
maneuver turn direction, (ii) enabling me to predict a level two alert, vs. react to it.
In space for additional comments:
I found that the 20NM display range (wide field view) was inadequate to predict intruder's
movement. No flight path predictor and the bunched display made predicting intruder'
movement essentially (im)possible because I didn't want to spend as much time off the PFD, on
the ND, as would be required to figure out where intruder is headed. And that's nice to know for
reasons given in 17 above.
Part 5 -- The Simulator
Q.# 2 (Response: Simulator biased my performance/slightly improved)
Comment: due somewhat to side stick controller vs. std yoke config.
Q.# 13
Because its nice to see a 'picture' of what you're doing while w/o visuals
Part 6 -- Miscellaneous
Q.#6
I didn't really notice this retraction. I'd prefer the fit. director command bars to command a
climb and turn to evade.
Q.#8
No one I know likes to go belly up to another aircraft, its favorable to a collision.
Q.# 10
It's essential to have a plan before you need it.
Q.# 15
You wouldn't know where he was going relative to your aircraft. Who cares where he is over
the ground as long as I'm not over the same ground at the same time.
Pilot 6
Part 1 2 NM range 3400 ft rwy spaeing
Q.# 18
Make heading set marker more visible by making it magenta, or flashing magenta when a
climb/turn alert is given.
In space for additional comments
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Move"Traffic" alertdisplayawayfromflightdirectorbarsapprox.1/2inch. As it is,thedisplay
is too(drowned,word not clear) in flight guidance info and is distracting.
Pilot not flying should have 1/2 mile scale (2 NM) displayed and relay pertinent info to pilot
flying.
Put distance to active waypoint on PFD, below active waypoint.
Part 3
Q.# 17
Display on ND not large enough to determine intentions of other aircraft or any trend info of
intruder aircraft.
Part 4
Q.# 16
I felt the safest course of action was to follow the alert under all circumstances. No time for
judgments or evaluations.
Q.# 17
There should be a 15 degree pitch bar marked as such. 15 degrees is standard for an escape
maneuver. I found myself searching for the 15 degree pitch line. There should also be some
indication as to direction of (required, unclear word) turn and heading indication of the PFD.
Under circumstance the would require this system, namely IFR conditions, it would be essential
that it be certified for autopilot use only. This would necessitate the incorporation of a flight
director for the escape maneuver. Pilots who fly EFIS aircraft do so with a flight director in all
phases of flight. Not having one during the escape only adds to the stress of the maneuver.
The most important thing would be to insure the pilot tums the right direction. Left or Right.
This should be safeguarded in some type of automation and preset prior to initiating the
approach.
Consider moving the ND to sit directly to the right of the PFD. Eye movements left and right,
and not up and down would provide for an easier scan.
Pilot 7
Part 2
Q.# 17 (Response b. Occasionally I felt I would have broken off when no red alert was given.)
Comment: Airline procedures would have most crews initiating a separate maneuver or go
around earlier than the equipment called for it -- Just to be completely safe in IMC. When VMC
and traffic in sight however, I believe I would continue approach and not rely on equipment.
P.S. I related a close approach path problem at SFO to the researcher that I believe this
equipment would have helped with.
Part 3
Q.# 16
The situation display help confirm guidance
Q.# 17
I wanted to zoom into larger expanded scale as target got closer -- to verify geometry.
In the space for additional comments:
VSI - too hard to utilize.
Intruder symbols should be same as TCAS - some confusion initially
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Neededability to expandNAV displayto assistin joining localizer- atpresentI hadto relyof
flight director.
Part4
Q.#17
HeadingindegreesonPDIbelowthe10degreetick marker.
Pilot 8
Part 1 2NM range 3400ft rwy spacing
Q.#5-8
Outof windowviews- I lookedenoughto confirmIMC toothicktoseethrough.
Q.# 10
It wouldbemuchmoreeffectiveto makeFD turnredandcommandaction
Q.#11Voiceseemstoolate
Q# 12-14
Oncealevel2 alertisgiven(traffic) all I lookedfor wasaturnclimb. I completelyignoredthe
NAV display.Reason:Goalfor experimentisreactiontime. I knowwhichwayto go -- All I
needis thecommand.Realworld,though,I'd look atNAV Displayandcontinuallyevaluate
geometry.Thiswouldchangemy answersto 12-14.
Bottomline- experimentassumptionsdrovemy responses.
In space for additional comments:
At first, in the expanded range, the fixes moved by uncomfortably fast. I didn't like it. After a
few runs, I was used to it and liked it. But, I would like to know about the next fix off screen -
something like traffic is displayed. How about an own ship 2/3 down display (as opposed to own
ship centered in the ND). I understand why now, it's okay.
On practice I intentionally flew 1 1/4 dots off and got "Localizer" on the ADI. I think it still said
"localizer" instead of "Traffic" when the conflict appeared (HSI was normal).
Once again -- I strongly suggest paralleling TCAS. This means an aural "Traffic - Traffic" call
and aural "Clear of conflict" call.
Make the "turn climb" voice more urgent and quicker. Include a direction.
When traffic became a factor, I wanted better CRS and GS info on the HSI and I wanted traffic
info on the ADI. Keep it graphical if possible.
I'd like to see some predicting device on the intruder's display that would give me a heads up on
when I'll get a "Turn - Climb." For instance, if you use time to collision ( another TCAS
algorithm) you might have a mark at the 20 second point:
Consider auto range switch with localizer capture.
Consider procedurally for future
Expand range on final
Call traffic active on screen
Keep airplanes on same frequencies for better situational awareness
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Callleft or rightescapewhenestablishedonfinal orwhenbug.
Note:" Traffic" seemsto appearonFltDispay(0.4-0.5sec?)beforethegraphicsonNAV
Display.(That'sbetterthanreverse!)
Putsomeversionof theescapebugonADI.
As daywearson,reactionsseemto slow.Lateronesmorerealistic.
I like tgt (target) on screen at proper azimuth! but how can I tell if he's off scope or on course?
I believe TCAS does an open diamond. Do we? Why not? (As opposed to afilled diamond.)
Pilot 8, continued.
Part 2
In space for additional comments:
I found myself more and more evaluating threat potential. That's good, but I may have spent too
much time on the nav display. Any extra tools for helping determine when a level 2 warning
goes level 3 would help me not look so long and think so much about evaluating potential threat.
Once I get a level 2 warning and a path prediction for an intruder, I'd like to see it stay. When he
goes back white, I'd like to see the path stay, but turn white, at least for a while. This is
especially true for intruders crossing my flight path.
I'd really like the option to escape toward the intruder under some circumstances. If the flight
director gives me direction for escape -- this would be easy. Escape bug could flop sides when
given geometry proved this solution (and it should be annunciated on the ADI).
Part 3
Q.# 16
I wanted to see more detail. I wanted to see his flight path and closure rate.
Q.#2
I'd split this question up - analyze for loc capture to FAF
FAF to 1000'
100' to 500'
500' to rwy
or something similar.
Q.# 5
I assumed IMC. I'd look out a lot more if VFM or intermittent/marginal VMC
Q.# 8
Again - assumed IMC. I focused, post evasion, on the ND separation.
Q.# 9
There seemed to be a lag (0.2 -0.5 sec?) between visual and aural warning. This is bad, I think,
visual warning appears first.
Q.# 13
Definition of escape maneuver precluded analyzing intruder's position.., so, apart from knowing
which direction he was approaching from, the experiment seemed to force a "never" answer.
6O
Q.#14
Seeabove.ThereweretimesI'd liketo havemaneuvered-- especiallyaspeedadjustment,but
thoughtthatwasoutof theallowableactionsof theexperiment.
Q.# 15
Seeabove# 13
Improvementsto consider?
MoveF/Dbarsto commandescape
Makeauralwarningsimultaneouswithvisual
Makeanaural"traffic" call (likeTCAS)
Flash"Traffic" -- it's not reallyasnoticeableinyellow/ambersteadyasit shouldbe.
MultiplelinesontheND getmixedtogether.Maybeprioritizesome.
How aboutaprojectedflightpathfor intruderaftera"Traffic" warning?
Annunciatetheappearanceof theescapebugbetter.(tone?flashit? somethingonthe
ADI)
Part4, Pilot8 continued.
Q.#17
At 2500'-- theneedfor anexpandedisplayandintrudervectorinformationisevenmore
critical. PuttheintruderontheADI if hepassesin front -- includeAltitude-- Forwake
turbulenceavoidance?
In space for additional comments:
See previous comments -- all still apply
Q.# 15
If the question means did the display help to determine the nature of the maneuver I was about to
perform, the answer is no -- because it was a canned no-brainer procedure. If the question means
did the display help me determine the nature of the post maneuver geometry -- the answer is yes
-- every time!
Other notes:
-- I was more "nervous" at 2500". Tended to look outside more hoping for a glimpse thru the
fog.
-- Below 1000' avoidance maneuver made a much bigger psychological impression. Didn't like
tracking TFC + GS + LOC. I tended to cheat away from traffic here and elsewhere.
-- I want to look outside even more, but I'm afraid I'll miss the cue and add to my reaction time.
Part 5 -- The Simulator , Pilot 8 continued
Q.# 1-3
Just the fact that this is a repetitive part task simulator enhances my response. Making
reaction time a goal further affects how I did business.
Q.#9
Hardest part about side stick controller was using left handed.
Part 6 -- Miscellaneous
Q.# 1 The Flight path marker made all tracking very easy. Runway symbology is great! Didn't
even notice localizer sensitivity differences. I ignored the command bars after a while.
Q.# 5-6
Break-off bug is helpful -- given the required maneuver. But, it and command bars ought to be
dynamic - responding to geometry, in my opinion.
Q.#9
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Realworld,noonewouldescapethatviolently.
Q.# 10
Computershouldselectandcommandaproperescape.Pilotneedonlyreact.
I lovedintruderflightpath. Keepit anduseit more!!! (Seepreviouscomments)
Pilot 9
Part 1 2 NM range 3400 ft rwy spacing
Q.# 17
Several times traffic passed in front of me on final -- I would have gone around but system didn't
tell me to.
Q.# 18 Suggest roods.
1. Accentuate glideslope in contrast and size.
2. Shorten length of white predicted a/c path line in approach phase, okay in localizer intercept. It
is distracting as it "waves" back and forth during localizer track.
3. Vertical speed, as displayed, is useless.
4. Eliminate a/c impact point and runway symbol until below 1000' AGL on final.
Q.# 11
System voice should say "turn left/right and climb"
Part 2
Q.# 5-8
In IMC conditions pilot should not be looking out of windows for anything but ice!
Q.#9
I really don't know without seeing the traffic -- we didn't have near miss so that's okay!
Q.# 12
Confirm turn direction in turn.
Q.# 13
If I was given the option of choosing path it might be; right now my only options are to fly loc
and g/s and escape maneuver when alerted to do so.
Q.# 14
See #13 above
Q.# 15
See # 13 above
Part 4
Q.#3
The "10 mile mode" of navigation display of traffic provided little useful information (only that
there is traffic on right/left side, and relative position to me. It is useless to judge closure,
separation or trend -- in fact it distracts because it draws attention and causes pilot to dwell on it
while not being readily understandable.
Q.# 5,6,7,8
Approaches were in IMC conditions, therefore I did not look out windows.
Q.# 11
Voice should say "Left/right turn, Climb" -- Direction first.
Q.# 16
The 10 mile display is even more disconcerting and would cause me to go around because I can't
really tell what the intruder is doing. With the 2 mile display I could tell more about the
situation.
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Noteonescapebug: Whenit appearsonnav.displayit shouldblink twice(off/on)theonsteady
to catchmy attention.
Q.#12
I triedtofix in mymindwhatI wasgoingto do(directionof turn)priorto alert.
Q.#13,14,15
It reallyisnotmytaskto avoidcollisionbyjudgingintruderposition-- I just fly escapewhen
alerted(andhopefor best!)
Q.#17
Situationglideslopeindicatorshouldhavemorecontrast.Inhibit impactpoint(display)until
lessthan1000'onfinal.
Part6 -- TheSimulator
Q.#5
Shouldblinktwiceafteraddedto display.
Q.#8
Should be standard go around to specific altitude -- (use, wo_vl not clear) 15 degrees nose up.
Q.# 11
If either you or the intruder is one dot off loc, something is amiss.
Q.# It has to be relative to me!
Pilot 10
Part 1 2 NM range 3400 ft rwy spacing
Q.#3
Expanded mode too expanded -- traffic off screen pops up and becomes a factor.
Q.#6
Only with TCAS safe front crossing
Q.# 10
Please direction (Lt or Rt)
Q.# 13
Prior to emergency alert
Q.# 14
after alert, I moved immediately
Q.# 16
Unknown if I could climb into intruder with present system.
Q.# 17
No, too little info to argue command
Q.# 18
Aural tone/chime for 1st level alert
In space for additional comments:
Put course guidance in PFD for escape so pilot can focus on one instrument during critical
maneuvers. Tie command bars to course, altitude, pitch, and bank desired.
Part 2
Q.#2
If blank, more if traffic in view
Q.#6
response: never look -- comment: IMC, except predicted cross in front.
Q.# 9 (Was adequate time allowed)
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Butwhatif I hadnotseenthisfor 22years.
Q.#10
Lt turn,climb,etc.
Q.#11
Givedirection
Q.#13
Priorto intruderalert
Q.#14
Assumedagowasamust
Q.#15
Priorto thealert
Q.#17
Wouldlike theoptiontoresetsystemif desirednotto breakout(i.e.,VFRorbrokenconditions.
Wouldlike symbolfor othera/cdirection.(Handsketchshowssymbolfor secondaircraftrotated
with its heading.)
Pilot 10,continued
Part3
Q.#4
Scalenotexpandedenough
Q.#6
IMC, unlesssuspectedfrontalcrossing
Q.#9
GivenI was"primed"for it
Q.#13
Priorto thealert-- situationawareness
Q.#14
Notafterthealert
Q.#15
Samemoveeverytime
Q.#17
Havecandystripebugarectanglew/oanotchasI understandweareexpectedto turnatleast45
degrees.Possiblyasmaller10-20degreesarcof greenbeyondthebugto indicateanexpected
roll outrange-- againhelpfulif onthePFD.
I missexpandedview.
Part4
Q.#3
Expanded
Q.#4
Unexpandedharderto interpretquickly
Q.#12
Exceptcheckcandystripebugif unsure.
Q.#13
Priorto intrusion
Q.#15
Beforetheintrusion
Q.#16
64
If I knewanaircraftwaspassingin front,I wouldwantto avoidvortexevenif no impact
conflict.Q.#17
ToomuchonPDF[ ...unclear words...then, ]goal post (white)]
In space for additional comments:
Would like a single chime when "Traffic" first illuminated - esp. VFR conditions.
Pilot 10, continued
Part 5 -- The Simulator
Q.#2
No motion, hand controller seems stiff
Q.# 10
Loc intercept and roll out tough
Q.# 14
N/A
Part 6
Q.# 6 (retracting command bars at alert)
Might help to have them.
Q.#7
Easy to over bank with no motion
Q.# 9 (responded escape maneuver was somewhat objectionable)
Comment: Vertigo
Q.# 11
aural chime
Q.# 15
Don't know
In space for additional comments:
Would like to try intruder w/ground track vs. relative track.
Pilot 11
Part 1
Q.# 17
Only if in IMC
Q.# 18 (Suggest Mods)
Excellent as is!
Part 2
Q.# 17
In IMC, once I received an alert I would still execute the escape maneuver even with the
expanded information.
In space for additional comments:
The expanded display is extremely important, it allows the pilot to track the intruder display much
more accurately and closely. The negative aspect of this is that it increases pilot workload
moderately due to the extra emphasis placed on observing the intruder. My aircraft control
suffered much more when I had a traffic alert than while in the nonexpanded display. I also
found I relied more on the audible "Turn Climb" than the visual "Turn Climb" on the PFD,
which is just the opposite from yesterday.
Part 3
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Q.#17(Suggestroods)
Providingawindarrowandgroundspeedreadoutin thePFDwouldbenice,butwouldnot
actuallyaidin theperformanceof theescapemaneuver.
In spacefor additionalcomments:
I amveryimpressedwith thepotentialfor theimplementationof thissystem.
Part4
Q.#16( response:Alwaysagreedwith thedisplayandprocedure)
Comment:If in IMC I fell youhaveto executetheescapemaneuver!If VMC andthetargetwas
in sight,I couldhaveevaluatedthenecessityof theescapealittle more.
Q.#17(SuggestMods)
Excellentdisplaysandprocedures,theonlyotherhelpfulinformationwouldpossiblybeatrend
"worm" onthetargetwhilein the10milescale.
In spacefor additionalcomments:
Overall,I amimpressedwith thisnewtechnology,I thinkit wouldbeof immensevalueat
certainairportsespeciallywhileflying in IMC.
In space for additional comments:
Overall an excellent idea with grand potential. From the viewpoint of flight deck personnel, I
think most pilots will find it a favorable system.
Pilot 12
Part 1
Q.# 16
This relative path is very helpful in knowing the relative position of the possible intruder and in
anticipating any possible maneuver.
Q.# 18 ( Suggest roods)
The intruder path display is the most desirable presentation because it not only gives you relative
position but allows you to anticipate any possible problems.
Part 2
Q.# 18 (Suggest roods)
Brighten and move the heading bug to 60 degrees -- This is emergency procedure to avoid a
midair collision.
In space for additional comments:
The intruder path display is important for two major reasons:
1. It gives you better relative position.
2. It allows possible options to consider instead of aborting the approach such (as) increasing
speed slightly, move to parallel the localizer momentarily or climbing/descending off glide path
slightly.
Part 3
Q.# 3 (response: ND traffic display somewhat helpful)
To determine the other aircraft's relative position.
Q.# 15
The seriousness of avoiding a possible midair made the evasive maneuver a mechanically
structured emergency procedure.
Q.# 16
The seriousness of this situation necessitates a maneuver that assures separation -- immediately!
from the other aircraft.
Q.# 17 (Suggest roods)
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Sincetheheadingbugissuchacrucialpartof notonlyheadingbutdirectionduringthe
maneuver,it shouldbeaverybrightandobviouscolor-- Orange/pink/red.etc.
In space for additional comments:
It would be very helpful if the glideslope indicator was also more visible -- brighter in color.
Part 6 -- Miscellaneous
Q.# 14 (relative path display)
I support this feature 100 percent.
Pilot 13
Part 1
Q.# 18 (Suggest roods)
I would like to compare (reaction) time with yoke and (side) stick
Pilot 14
Part 2
Q.# 17
Wake turbulence needs to be considered.
Q.# 18
Traffic on PFD could be useful.
More info on other aircraft could be useful to PNF.
In space for additional comments:
Much more interaction between crew members is essential -- ... more information presented to
the PNF could help in keeping the PF updated on traffic information.
Part 3
Q.# 17 (Suggest roods)
In hand flying it was difficult to use the ND. The FD needs to be brighter or higher contrast.
The traffic display needs to be expanded.
In space for additional comments:
In hand flying it may be better to have the traffic also displayed on the PFD.
It may be better to have a single cue FD for those who fly it all the time.
Part 4
Q.# 17 (Suggest roods)
Same as before. Need more resolution on ND.
Part 6 -- Miscellaneous
Q.#6
Would have been better to have FD display the maneuver.
In space for additional comments:
Excellent start to discovering the best presentation for parallel approaches.
Should probably try with closer spacing.
Definitely need a 2 person crew totally involved in the procedure.
Should experiment with more information of both displays.
Pilot 15
Part 1
Q.# 18 ( Suggest roods)
Same as 2500 ft. survey, except escape heading bug should flash for a period when presented and
also during the alert. Should also be bolder presentation, i.e. bright red.
Part 2
Q.# 17
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Hadonewherenoconflictwasgoingto occur,butfollowedcommand.
Q.#18 (Suggestroods)
Explodeviewautomaticallyif pilot forgetsatmarker,orwith trafficwarning.
Part3
Q.#12
Fortraffic "Traffic" always
Part4
Q.#17
In my B-757anyactivetrackonthemapis anactiveLNAV track.
Maybetheparallelrunwaycenterlinecouldbedashed.
Comparedto theexplodeddisplay,informationis scant.A 'Turn Climbismuchharderto
anticipate.
Part5 -- TheSimulator
Q.#16(Eyetrackingequipment)
Did notnotice
Pilot 16
Part 1
Q.# 18 (Suggested mods)
I would like better vertical speed info. I was concentrating so much on altitude I frequently
missed vertical speed with a quick glance. Thus I would sometimes call "pos rate gear up"
when in fact I was still sinking. If I took extra time to locate and process vertical speed then I
frequently over banked the aircraft due to the aggressive aileron required to escape and my
extended look away from attitude.
Too many lines when on loc. I don't see a need for my own aircraft trend line or an FMC line.
Just LOC centerline and my ground track would suffice. I don't have time to see and/process
info if there is too much of it. I love zoom in and the 2 mile scale, especially when the two
aircraft are in or near the abeam position.
Part 2
Q.# 17
When an amber traffic is shown with the other aircraft's path passing in front of mine, I would
like to go missed approach and return for another without having to perform the abrupt escape
maneuver.
In space for additional comments:
I was surprised at how little deviation by either aircraft close to the airport would trigger a traffic
warning and/or escape turn/climb.
Part 3
Q.# 17 (Suggest mods)
I want to zoom in closer i.e. 5 mile scale when I feel other traffic intrudes into my comfort zone
and certainly when I get a yellow traffic display.
In space for additional comments:
I never looked out the window before, during, or after and alert in the clouds because I assumed
weather would prevent seeing other aircraft. Would look if not IMC.
I did find myself looking more at potential conflicting traffic as I became more comfortable with
the cockpit instruments and the cross check became more efficient.
Part 4
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Q.#17
I foundthattheflight number,airlinedesignatorinfoof theND addedto clutterandgavemeno
usefulinfo. I alsofoundthesmallairplanesymbolontheattitudeindicatorto beconfusing.It
seemedto contradictrawdataattimes.
In spacefor additionalcomments:
I neverlookedoutof thewindowprior toandescapemaneuverorduringthatmaneuverbecause
I wasin thecloudsanddidn't feelI wouldseeanything.Thatprobablywouldbethejob of the
pilot not flying anyway.
I do like thealertfeaturebecauseit givesyounoticeto preparefor possibleescape.WhenI get
analertit wouldbehelpfulto zoomin andgoto asmallerscale,i.e.,5 milemapto helpevaluate
theconflictingtraffic situation.
Part5 --TheSimulator
Q.#16
Nevernoticedit (theeye tracking equipment) during any test runs, forgot it was there.
In space for additional comments:
Concerning the break off bug, not only did I like the stripes, but also the size of the bug. Makes
it easy to locate in a hurry.
I wanted to see stronger crosswinds and to have the crosswind component vary with altitude as in
the real world. This would have created more difficulty in staying on the localizer.
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Figure 1. AILS parallel approach concept.
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Figure 2. The PFD and ND without modifications.
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Figure 3. Modified lateral path constraints based on DGPS (Plan view of approach airspace).
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Figure 4. Example PFD and ND displays in the nominal AILS approach condition with no alerts.
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Figure 5. Example PFD and ND with level-two localizer deviation alert.
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Figure6.Level-twol calizerdeviationshownin thePFDandND.
75
Amber traffic
alphanumeric
TCAS formatted
Traffic symbol
Figure 7. Example level-two traffic alert presented on the PFD and ND.
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Figure 8. Example level-three traffic alert. Mandatory break-off using the escape maneuver (accompanied by aural
"Turn, climb .... ").
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Figure 9. Segmented alerting criterion.
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Figure 9. Concluded.
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Figure 10. Nominal AILS displays, no alerts.
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Figure 11. Level-two localizer deviation alert.
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(a) Modified conventional display. (b) Enhanced display.
Figure 12. Level-three localizer deviation alert.
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Figure 13. Level-two traffic alert presented on the PFD and ND.
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(a) Modified conventional display. (b) Enhanced display.
Figure 14. Level-three traffic alert (mandatory break-off using the escape maneuver).
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Figure 15. The seven traffic path geometries (TPG's) used in the tests.
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Figure 16. TSRV Simulator.
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Figure 18. Miss distance versus runway spacing and display format.
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Figure 19. The effects of runway separation and relative speed on miss distance.
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Figure 20. Mean miss distance versus intruder relative speed.
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Figure 21. Lateral deviation of the intruder from its approach centerline at the time of alert.
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Figure 22. Miss distance versus the level-three-alert traffic path geometries.
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Figure 23. Separation distance between the two airplanes at the time of alert for traffic path geometries and speed
combinations.
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Figure 24. Separation of the two airplanes versus time.
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Figure 25. Effects of intruder relative speed and runway spacing on miss distance.
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Figure 26. Miss distance as a function of intruder speed, runway spacing and traffic path geometry.
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Figure 27. Pilot reaction time versus display format.
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Figure 28. The TSRV Simulator with oculometer data areas illustrated by white dashed lines.
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Figure 29. Dwell percentages on the PFD and ND for the two display formats, all runs with intrusions.
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Figure 30. Dwell percentages on the PFD and ND by run segment (display formats combined).
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Figure 31. Dwell percentages on the PFD and ND by segment, modified conventional display.
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Figure 32. Dwell percentages on the PFD and ND by segment, enhanced display.
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